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Evaluating Regulatory Interpretations:

Individual Statements
By

RUSSELL

L. WEAVER*

Deference principles have been in existence for nearly two centuries.' Those principles seem relatively straightforward. For example, when the meaning of a regulatory provision is in doubt, deference
principles require a reviewing court to accept an administrative
agency's interpretation and application of its governing statute; and
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.A. 1974, J.D., cum laude, 1978,
University of Missouri.
I The concept of deference was used, initially, as an aid to the interpretation of the
Constitution. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336 (1816); Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). It since has been used in statutory interpretation,
see Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987) ("It is settled that courts
should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by
the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute."); Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23
Wall.) 374, 382 (1874) (Treasury Department construction of statute, "though not controlling, is not without weight, and is entitled to respectful consideration."); United States v.
Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 157, 160-61 (1841) ("The construction so given by the Treasury
Department to any law affecting its arrangements and concerns, is certainly entitled to great
respect. Still, however, if it is not in conformity to the true intendment and provisions of
the law, it cannot be permitted to conclude the judgment of a court of justice."); Edward's
Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (The "construction of those who
were called upon to act under the law, and were reappointed to carry its provisions into
effect, is entitled to very great respect."), and in the interpretation of executive orders. See,
e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 688 F.2d 797, 807 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982) (Just as courts defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulations, "[s]imilar
deference is shown an agency interpretation of an executive order." (citation omitted)),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983).
2 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112,
123-24 (1987) ("[W]e have accorded the Board deference with regard to its interpretation
of the NLRB as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the statute.");
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403 ("It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable
construction of a regulatory scheme adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement
of that statute."); United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666-71 (1986) ("The
relevant federal agencies, however, .

.

. have interpreted the statute ....

We must uphold

that interpretation if the statute yields no definitive contrary legislative command and if the
agencies' approach is a reasonable one." (citations omitted)).
The most important recent deference decision is Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984). In that case, the United
States Supreme Court defined the parameters of deference. The Court stated that a reviewing
court should first determine whether Congress specifically addressed the interpretive question
at issue. If so, then the court should honor Congress's intent. If Congress has not specifically
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regulations. 3 But, the apparent simplicity of deference principles is
deceiving. 4 The federal courts apply a variety of deference standards,
some of which conflict,5 and they sometimes supplant those standards with other interpretive rules.6 As a result, many question
7
whether deference principles are consistently applied.

addressed the issue, then the court should attempt to determine whether the responsible
administrative agency had resolved the issue. If so, the court should not decide the interpretive question on its own. Instead, it should defer to the agency's interpretation if it "is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
Chevron suggests that the appropriate degree of deference depends on the situation.
When Congress explicitly delegates interpretive authority to an agency by leaving a gap in
a statutory scheme requiring or permitting an agency to promulgate regulations to fll that
gap, there has been an express delegation of authority. In this situation the agency's
interpretive decisions (its regulations) are given "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844. Even in the absence of an
express delegation to promulgate legislative regulations, deference is appropriate provided
that the agency's interpretation "represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute." Id. at 845 (quoting United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
3 The Supreme Court has stated that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
should be accepted unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977); see also INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62,
72, reh'g denied, 395 U.S. 987 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969);
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). The Court has applied
other standards as well. See Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative
Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. Prrr. L. RPv. 587, 591-97 (1984) [hereinafter The
Deference Rule].
I See The Deference Rule, supra note 3, at 597-600, which discusses the deference
rule's application to interpretations of administrative regulations. Other articles have discussed the rule's application to statutory interpretations. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1983); James T. O'Reilly,
Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review
Amendment, 49 U. CN. L. REv. 739 (1980); David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In
Defense of Deference: JudicialReview of Agency Action, 31 ADm . L. REv. 329 (1979).
See The Deference Rule, supra note 3, at 590-97.
6 See id. at 597-600.
See id. at 590-91, 601-02; see also United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 595 (1981)
(The majority in Swank rejected an administrative interpretation without any discussion of
the deference rule. Justice White, dissenting, observed: "I dissent from the Court's opinion
which is nothing more than a substitution of what it deems neat and proper for the wholly
reasonable views of the Internal Revenue Service as to the meaning of its own regulation
and of the statutory provisions."). Further, in Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 712 (1980), Justice Marshall stated in dissent:
The plurality ignores applicable canons of construction, apparently because it
finds their existence inconvenient ....
Can it honestly be said that the Secretary's interpretation of the Act is "unreasoned" or "unsupportable?" ....
The plurality's disregard of these principles gives credence to the frequently
voiced criticism that they are honored only when the Court finds itself in
substantive agreement with the agency action at issue.
Also instructive is Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946), in which a criminal
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Recent litigation suggests that the federal courts encounter other,
equally serious problems in their attempts to apply deference principles. 8 Some of these problems are fundamental and definitional.
For example, courts have had difficulty determining what constitutes an administrative interpretation. Administrative officials make
many different types of interpretive statements in a variety of
contexts. 9 Some of these statements are clearly authoritative,10 but

conviction under the Emergency Price Control Act was'remanded so that the jury could be
instructed on the proper interpretation of the statute. The Court found the regulations
issued by the price administrator to be vague: "Not even the administrator's interpretations
of his own regulations can cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to otherwise
vague language." Id. at 622.
1 Besides the problems identified in this Article, courts also struggle to apply the
deference rule in cases involving inter-agency conflicts. See Russell L. Weaver, Judicial
Deference to Regulatory Interpretations:Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1991)
[hereinafter Inter-Agency Conflicts].
9 See Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (employee phone numbers and addresses ordered released to federal employees'
labor union by the Federal Labor Relations Authority), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990);
Shurberg Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (agency decision
to favor minority owned purchasers in distress sale situations), reh'g denied, - U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Stone v. Comm'r, 865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (tax court
proceeding); Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
861 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1988) (agency finding of a violation of OSHA safety rules); Caiola
v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (agency control over debarment proceeding of
government contractors); Taylor v. United States, 848 F.2d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 1988) (customs
officials' decision to seize imported goods under the Switchblade Knife Act); Clark-Cowlitz
Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (nuclear power plant
licensing decision), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913 (1988); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 822 F.2d
132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agency determination regarding priorities among the nation's known
hazardous waste sites); Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(agency adjudication of disputes among long distance carriers); Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v.
Department of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1986) (administration of a grant program);
Wong v. Department of State, 789 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1986) (visa revocation proceeding);
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (nuclear power
plant licensing decision); Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (decision on
licensing); City of Gillette v. FERC, 737 F.2d 883, 884-85 (10th Cir. 1984) (adjudicative
decision); Deukmejian v. Postal Serv., 734 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1984) (determination regarding
mailing rates); Ganadera Indus., S.A. v. Block, 727 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(decision to deny meat import privileges); Foulkes v. Comm'r, 638 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.
1981) (agency decision to disallow deduction); Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (agency decision to deny request for political asylum); Volunteer State Bank v.
National Bank of Commerce, 684 F. Supp. 964 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (agency decision
regarding application to establish a branch bank).
10See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 169-170 (1989)
(promulgation of interpretive regulation by the Department of Labor); Quang Van Han v.
Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989) (Social Security Ruling 82-40 interpreting the Social
Security Act and supporting regulations.); United States v. Lockheed Corp., 817 F.2d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals approving the
actions of government contractor); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 752 F.2d 650
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many are not. As one court observed: "It is in the nature of a
complex administrative bureaucracy to issue a variety of reports,

releases, opinions, advisory letters, and other similar statements in
performing its task."'" The federal courts have disagreed about
which of these statements deserve deference.
Interpretive statements by individual agency employees, espe-

cially subordinates, 2 have provided a particular source of conflict.
Courts disagree about when such statements may be treated as
administrative interpretations, and when they constitute nothing

more than the individuals' personal views. 3 As one judge noted,
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984) (agency issued regulations), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099
(1985); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (EPA
promulgated and published in the Federal Register an "interpretive rule"); Florida Nat'l
Guard v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 699 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir.) (federal agency ordered
the Florida National Guard to pay travel expenses of union representatives incurred while
negotiating on behalf of the union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983); Pennzoil Co. v.
Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) (interpretive ruling
issued by the Federal Energy Administration), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Quincy
Oil, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 468 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1979) (agency finding of
a violation of petroleum price regulations); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (Federal Energy Administration rulings pursuant to the agency's authority
to regulate the price of petroleum).
1 Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638, 645 (E.D. Cal. 1986). The court went on to note
that "[s]tatements issued range from formal written pronouncements published in the
Federal Register through interpretations from top administratorm to letters penned by the
lowest-level employee." Id. Further, as one commentator noted, interpretation is "[ain
inescapable part of administration." Hans J. Morgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in
Administrative Law, 28 IowA L. REv. 575 (1943).
22 Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 784
(D. Del. 1978) ("The plaintiffs cite numerous public statements by FEA personnel endorsing
the proportional method and contend that the FEA construed the regulations in effect
during the relevant period to permit use of that method. The FEA attempts to dismiss the
pronouncements on which the plaintiffs rely as clearly erroneous and merely the unauthorized and unofficial views of several of the agency auditors."), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil
Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1985) with Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at
171-72 (suggesting that only interpretations that are "institutional in character" deserve
deference). Though the court in Pennzoil did not expressly define which agency interpretations are institutional in character, the court in Diaz held that a reviewing court "must
give great weight to the pronouncements emanating from an agency's national office which
are intended to provide guidance to an agency nationwide, and at least some consideration
to other statements." Diaz, 648 F. Supp. at 645. The Diaz court based this ruling on the
fact "that the statement by the regional official did not reflect an official position because
it was 'not approved by [the agency's] General Counsel or by any departmental official in
the national office.' Id. (quoting Miller v. Yonakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144-145 n.25).
,3See First South Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 729 F. Supp. 1559,
1570 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of a statute need not be embodied in
a rule or regulation in order to be accorded deference."), rev'd, 926 F.2d 339 (1991); Diaz,
648 F. Supp. at 645 ("The absence of a consistent standard by which to determine whether
a statement issued by the agency is an official agency interpretation makes it difficult for
a district court to decide when to defer to purported agency opinions voiced by its staff.").
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"Although common sense tells us that the utterance of a lower-

echelon agency employee should not be accorded weight equal to
the formal interpretation of an agency chief, the case law does not
suggest clear standards by which to distinguish the different types

of statements." 14
This Article examines recent litigation on the subject of deference, giving particular attention to judicial treatment of interpretive
statements by individual agency employees ("individual statements"). It begins by examining judicial disagreements regarding

individual statements, 5 and suggests some reasons for the disa7
greement. 16 Then, it offers some solutions to these disagreements,'
and some insight into the proper uses of individual statements. 8
I.

EVALUATIVE D-mcuvrIms

"Individual statements" present special problems for the courts.
Deference principles assume that the responsible administrative
agency has authoritatively interpreted a regulatory provision.' 9 Faced
with such an interpretation, deference principles require a court to
defer. In many instances, agencies do make authoritative pronouncements. 20 For example, they state their interpretations in the
z2
form of substantive regulations, 2' final adjudicative decisions,
interpretive bulletins or policy statements issued to the public,21 or

14Diaz, 648 F. Supp. at 645; see also Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F.
Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) ("Although the Court deems a memorandum from a
former official of an agency charged with administration of a statute to be persuasive
authority, such a memorandum cannot be held an official pronouncement by the agency of
the meaning of that statute.").
,1See infra part I.
16 See infra part II.
"7See infra part III.
" See infra part IV.
," See Inter-Agency Conflicts, supra note 8.
0 See cases cited supra note 10.
1,See, e.g., Illinois v. FAA, 832 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that FAA had
promulgated elaborate set of noise control regulations, duly codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations).
2 See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 590 (1989) (involving
review of the Interior Board of Land Appeals's decision finding that Amoco underpaid
royalties from its natural gas operation under a federal offshore lease).
2 See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144-45 n.25 (1979) (addressing HEW statutory
interpretations issued through official pronouncement called "Program Instructions"); Diaz
v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638, 645 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (noting that agency policy statements may
take many forms ranging "from formal written pronouncements published in the Federal
Register through interpretations from top administrators to letters penned by the lowestlevel employee"); cases cited supra note 10.
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instructional manuals designed to inform lower-level employees of

24
the meaning and application of regulatory provisions.
However, many interpretive statements are not issued by agencies in their own names.2 In many administrative agencies, especially in large ones, it is physically impossible for the agency head
to be involved actively in the day-to-day administration of every
regulatory program.26 Often, the agency head delegates authority
to subordinates and becomes involved only when difficult or politically sensitive issues arise. As a result, subordinates are forced to

make interpretive decisions. They state these decisions in a variety

of contexts: congressional hearings, 27 affidavits submitted in litigation,2 and legal briefs. 29 In addition, they informally advise

24 See, e.g., Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Ist Cir. 1988)
(stating that it is the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) duty to "insure through
the FPM [Federal Personnel Manual], 'personnel instructions, operational guidance, policy
statements, related material on government wide personnel programs, and advice on good
practice in personnel management to other agencies' (citing FPM, ch. 171, sub. 2-1 (June
10, 1986))); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 785 (D.
Del. 1978) ("Deference has been accorded to the views expressed in staff manuals and other
guidance issued to an agency's personnel in several cases."). Despite these holdings, courts
do distinguish between such manuals and more informal interpretive statements. See, e.g.,
New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 360, 364-366 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that informal interpretive statements made by agency staff members differ from
and do not carry the weight of an official agency interpretation), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1055 (1988).
See Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 160 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682
F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) ("[A]lthough the Court deems a memorandum
from a former official of an agency charged with administration of a statute to be persuasive
authority, such a memorandum cannot be held an official pronouncement by the agency of
the meaning of that statute."); Dorchester Gas Producing Co. v. Department of Energy,
582 F. Supp. 911, 916 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that although interpretations issued
from the DOE's Regional Director of Compliance constitute informal advice and are not
official, the DOE's Office of General Counsel issues official interpretations).
6 See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The DeliberativeProcessPrivilege, 54
Mo. L. REv. 279, 309 (1989).
27See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419,
424 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (testimony given by EPA's Assistant Administrator for Solid 'Waste
and Emergency Response before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works);
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 998, 1018
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (testimony by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, for Labor Management
Relations, before a House of Representatives subcommittee); Conoco, Inc. v. Hodel, 626
F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Del. 1986) (testimony by several agency staff members before various
Senate and House committees as to the interpretation of a particular statute).
28See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 540
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (affidavits of the President of the Army's Discharge Review Board (DRB)
and the Chief of the Air Force's DRB submitted as evidence); California ex rel. Dep't of
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regulated entities about the meaning and content of regulatory
provisions.3 0

The federal courts have disagreed about how to treat these
statements. Many courts are reluctant to defer to individual statements and are particularly disinclined to defer to statements by
inferior officials. As the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
(TECA) stated in Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy,3 1 only
interpretations that are "institutional in character" are entitled to

Transp. v. United States, 561 F.2d 731, 733 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (affidavit of a Federal
Highway Administration official entered as evidence of agency interpretation).
29 See, e.g., Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan v. USX Corp., 900 F.2d 727, 732
n.4 (4th Cir. 1990) (expressing concern about deferring to interpretations rendered by agency
counsel, but deferring to positions taken in an amicus curiae brief concluding that they
reflected the agency's rather than counsel's views); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v.
Sykes, 676 F. Supp. 597, 602-04 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Department of Transportation submitted
amicus curiae memorandum of law interpreting and explaining its regulations in private
litigation; court treated the brief as an administrative interpretation and deferred to the
conclusions contained therein.); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 858-59 n.25 (1975) (SEC filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme Court to
adopt a particular interpretation of the federal securities law.), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975); Gomez v. Department of the Air Force, 869 F.2d 852, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1989) (The
court noted the rule of deference and asked the agency to submit supplemental briefs
defining its position. The court considered the briefs, but found them unhelpful.). But see
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 840 F.2d 947, 952
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that the court need not treat as binding an interpretation of
a rule in a brief submitted to the Federal Labor Relations Authority by Counsel for the
General Services Administration.); Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (treating the prior interpretation of agency's
position as official position rather than interpretation submitted in amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the agency purporting to alter the agency's interpretation of a regulation); Ames
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977)
(rejecting interpretation offered by agency in amicus curiae brief).
10 See, e.g., Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 169-72. Such statements "are to be given little
weight, as such, unless they are institutional in character." Id. at 171; see also Dorchester
Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 916 n.2 (holding that letters and memoranda from agency officials
provide informal advice but carry "little weight for purposes of regulatory interpretation").
The courts have confronted such interpretive statements in a variety of other contexts. See,
e.g., Arizona Elec. Power Coop. v. FERC, 631 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (El Paso,
an intervenor, relied on interpretive testimony by a Federal Power Commission staff member, in hearings on its interim curtailment plan. The Court rejected the claim that such
reliance was proper, noting that the testimony "was far removed from the type of specific
guidance" required.); PhillipsPetroleum, 449 F. Supp. at 784-85 ("[P]laintiffs cite numerous
public statements by FEA personnel... and contend that the FEA construed the regulations
... during the relevant period [in accordance with those interpretations]. The FEA attempts
to dismiss the pronouncements ... as clearly erroneous and merely the unauthorized and
unofficial views of several of the agency auditors." The court concluded that "the opinions
of the FEA's auditors and compliance officials do not deserve significantly less deference
solely because these officials were not authorized to issue binding interpretations of the
regulations.").
11 680 F.2d 156 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983).
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deference.12 In Pennzoil, the Court held that statements "authored
by agency staff or individual Commissioners 'cannot be considered
as... official expression[s] of the will and intent of the [agency]."' 33
In Copperweld Corp. v. United States, the General Counsel of
the International Trade Commission rendered an interpretation to
one of the agency's commissioners. The court refused to treat the
interpretation as an "official pronouncement by the agency of the
meaning of ... [the] statute." 35 At best, the statement would be
regarded as "persuasive authority.' '36 In DorchesterGas Producing
Co. v. Departmentof Energy3 7 the Department of Energy's Region
VI Director of Compliance sent a letter advising Texaco regarding
the meaning and application of regulatory provisions. The court
concluded that this letter was "in the nature of informal advice
[given] by agency employees," and was therefore "to be accorded
3
little weight for purposes of regulatory interpretation.' '
The Pennzoil court's distinction, between statements that are
institutional and those that are not, finds support in at least one
United States Supreme Court decision. The Court has not definitively addressed the issue. However, in Miller v. Youakim, 39 a
regional official in what was then the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), sent an interpretation to state
officials. This interpretation had not been approved by HEW's
national office. Later, HEW issued a "Program Instruction" contrary to the unapproved interpretation. The Supreme Court, concluding that the Program Instruction was "the agency's first and
only national interpretation" of the relevant provision, deferred to
the Program Instruction and disregarded the regional official's
prior unapproved interpretation. 40

32 Id. at 171; see also Diaz, 648 F. Supp. at 645 (stating that "some courts have ruled
that 'non-institutional' opinions, such as informal letters by agency staff or interpretations

by an agency attorney, are entitled to little, if any, deference"); Dorchester Gas, 582 F.
Supp. at 916 n.2 (holding that "informal advice by agency employees which do not have

the stature of official agency interpretations ... are to be accorded little weight for purposes
of regulatory interpretation").
3 Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 161 n.8 (quoting SEC v. National Student Mktg., 538 F.2d
404, 406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977)).
34682 F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 582 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Tex. 1983).

Id. at 916 n.2.
" 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
40See id. at 144 n.25.
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Despite these holdings, many courts consider, and at times,
defer to individual interpretations. 41 In Diaz v. INS, 42 the court

refused to follow Pennzoil because "the Ninth Circuit has deferred
to opinions that apparently received neither top level approval nor

had national application. '

43

Keeffe v. Library of Congress,44 in-

volved the Library of Congress's conflict of interest regulations
interpreted by the Director of the Library's Congressional Research
Service. The District of Columbia Circuit treated the Director's

interpretation as the agency's interpretation: "[W]e will not disturb
the reasonable judgment of an agency of Congress as to the meaning of its own regulations." 4
In other cases, courts have "considered" individual statements
for a variety of purposes. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department

of Energy,46 the court rejected the Department of Energy's argument that "only the FEA's General Counsel and his staff had the
authority to issue official interpretations of its regulations." 47 The
court concluded that statements made by auditors and other lowerlevel officials had "value as evidence of contemporaneous construction." 4 Even the TECA, which decided Pennzoil, held in a prior
decision, Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy,49 that "statements by ...

FEA auditors and other lower level officials" could

50

be considered.
These diverse decisions cannot be entirely reconciled. They can
be partially explained. In some cases, such as Phillips Petroleum
," See, e.g., In re Department of Energy Stripper Well Exemption, 520 F. Supp. 1232,
1255 (D. Kan. 1981) (holding that to determine the issue of an agency's consistent interpretation of a particular statute, a court need not restrict its inquiry to official interpretations),
rev'd, 690 F.2d 1375 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982); United States v. Exxon Corp., 87
F.R.D. 624 (D.D.C. 1980) ("[I]n certain circumstances, courts may look to lower level
agency interpretations to decipher the agency's own understanding of its regulations.").
11 648 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
41 Id.
at 645.
- 777 F.2d 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
, Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 777 F.2d 1573, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ganadera
Industrial, S.A. v. Block, 727 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Department of Agriculture
official withdrew appellant's privilege to import meat into the United States based on his
own interpretation of regulatory requirements.); but see Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395,
399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that "deference is inappropriate" because the authority under
the statute was shared by several agencies and that "the only agency official to construe
[the regulation] ... was the DLA's debarring official, not the head of the agency").
46 449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del. 1978).
47

Id. at 784.

"' Id.
41 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
"Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1056 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1978).
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and Standard Oil, courts did not actually defer to individual statements. Rather, they used those statements for collateral purposes.5'
But, some courts do defer. Thus, as the holdings in Diaz and
Copperweld suggest, courts simply disagree regarding the treatment
of individual statements. As Diaz shows, some courts are more
inclined to defer to these statements than others.
The difference between these two lines of cases is not as great
as the rhetoric might suggest. Most courts accept Pennzoil'sholding
that interpretations must be "institutional in character ' 52 before
they are entitled to deference, and they recognize that some individual statements are entitled to deference. However, courts disagree about which individual statements deserve deference. Pennzoil
holds that only those statements that have received high level
acceptance and approval deserve deference. Diaz agrees that only
authoritative interpretations are entitled to deference, but its analysis allows courts to treat a wider array of interpretations as
authoritative. In that case, the court was willing to consider as
authoritative an interpretation by the District Director of the INS's
San Francisco office. Under decisions like Pennzoil, Copperweld,
and Dorchester Gas, such an interpretation would probably have
been rejected as insufficiently authoritative.
II.

FORMAT

REQUIREMENTS

Judicial difficulties with individual statements stem, in part,
from the absence of "format requirements." Deference principles
were judicially created, and the courts have never developed clear
rules regarding when deference should be given. Courts have not,
for example, required agencies to state their interpretations in the
form of legislative rules or adjudicative decisions. " In addition,
they have not required agencies to publish their interpretations as
interpretive rules pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act (APA)14
provisions. Those provisions exempt interpretive rules from rulemaking requirements, 55 but require agencies to publish "statements

5I
52

See infra part IV.
Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 171.

53 The format problem was addressed in a recent article by Robert Anthony, Which
Agency InterpretationsShould Bind the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990). For a critique

of Professor Anthony's position, see Russell L. Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony and

Format Requirements, 40 KAN. L. REv. _(1992 forthcoming).
', 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988).
See id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
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of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency" in the Federal Register. 6
Instead, courts tend to evaluate interpretations on an ad hoc basis.
Some courts do impose procedural limitations. In Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Tully,57 the court refused to defer an individual statement.
The question was whether a federal statute preempted state law.
Even though the responsible agency had not taken a position on
the issue, the agency's Acting General Counsel wrote a letter to
the Special Counsel of the New York State Tax Commission stating
his belief that the act brought about a limited displacement of state
law.58 The court held that the General Counsel's opinion could not
be regarded as the agency's interpretation.5 9 Counsel had not followed the agency's established procedures governing the issuance
of interpretations60
The United States Supreme Court has had little to say about
the format issue. The notable exception is the Court's recent holding in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.61 In that case, the Court deferred to an interpretation,
embodied in the Secretary of Labor's citation. The Court justified
its decision by distinguishing between those interpretations that are
created as an "exercise of the agency's delegated lawmaking power,"
and those that are not. 62 The Court deferred to the Secretary's
citation because it "assume[d] a form expressly provided for by

- See id. § 552(a)(1)(D).
" 653 F.2d 497 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S.
245 (1982).
11See Mobil Oil Corp. v.Tully, 653 F.2d 497, 501-02 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 245 (1982).
11See id. at 502. The letter, on its face, suggested that deference might be inappropriate. The court stated:
The writer of the letter took care to limit its effectiveness by stating as
a caveat, "First, the time within which I was advised to require a response to
this question did not permit an exhaustive analysis of the question you posed."
Furthermore, as Judge McCurn said, "the conclusion in the letter was, in
light of Jones, reached either with reference to, or through the correct application of, judicially determined preemption principles."
Id. at 501-02.
10The court stated: "Finally, under DOE's own regulations, the letter is of little
value. It appears that the request to DOE for an interpretation did not comply with its
requirements for such an interpretation. Replies to such requests cannot be considered as
interpretations but only as 'providing general information.' 10 C.F.R. § 205.80 (1990)." Id.
at 502.
61

-

U.S. -

62 Martin

, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991).

v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
111 S.Ct. 1171, 1179 (1991).

-

U.S.....
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Congress." 63 The decision suggested that other interpretations, particularly those stated as interpretive rules or in enforcement guidelines, might be entitled to less deference. 64
The Court did not clearly define the standard of review to be
applied, but it suggested that interpretations that do not involve
an exercise of delegated lawmaking authority would not receive
actual deference. Thus, the Court seemed to indicate that the lower
courts should apply a variable deference standard. Some interpretations would receive actual deference as per the Court's prior
holding in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,65 under which interpretations involving an exercise
of delegated lawmaking authority should be accepted provided they
are "reasonable" or are not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.'"66 Such interpretations would receive actual
deference ("Chevron" deference). Other interpretations, those that
do not involve an exercise of "delegated lawmaking authority,"
would not receive actual deference. Rather, under Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.,67 courts should independently determine a provision's
63 Id., 111 S. Ct. 1179.

- See id., 111 S. Ct. 1179. The Court stated that such other interpretations are "not
entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary's
delegated lawmaking powers." Id., 111 S. Ct. 1179.
- 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a
regulation to implement a permit requirement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685. The EPA, counter to an earlier lower court decision,
interpreted the term "stationary source" to include an entire industrial plant, rather than
an individual source of pollution. The Court found the EPA construction of the term
permissible. Thus, despite a change in the agency's own interpretations, the Court deferred
to the EPA's construction.
6 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984). The Court stated:
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
.delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency.
Id. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
323 U.S. 134 (1944). Employees brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988), regarding overtime pay and inactive duty.
The Administrator's view, in rulings, interpretations, and opinions, was that employees
were not entitled to include sleeping and eating time. The court took note of these interpretations, but held that such interpretations did not control decisions of the courts.
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meaning, giving the agency's interpretation the weight it deserves
considering its persuasiveness., These interpretations need only be
"considered" ("Skidmore" deference).
Whether the Court really intended to adopt a "delegated lawmaking authority" standard is unclear. 69 What is clear is that such
a standard does not provide courts with a complete solution to the
problem of individual interpretations. In ordinary parlance, when
one speaks of agencies having "lawmaking authority," one thinks
of their authority to promulgate legislative rules. SEC v. Chenery
Corp. (Chenery IIY0 expands the definition of "lawmaking authority" by holding that agencies are free to create new rules either
legislatively or adjudicatively. 7 Martin extends this analysis still
further by holding that the Secretary of Labor's citations constitute
an exercise of lawmaking authority. Thus, it is difficult to determine precisely what a "delegated lawmaking authority" standard
means. In any event, under any definition of the phrase individual
agency employees, including subordinates, can and do exercise
delegated lawmaking authority.7 2 Thus, even under Martin's standard, a reviewing court might defer to individual statements.
Professor Robert Anthony, in a recent article, offers a somewhat different approach to the format issue.73 Anthony also distinguishes between Chevron interpretations and Skidmore
interpretations, 74 but he would impose relatively strict format requirements for Chevron interpretations, but few requirements for
Skidmore interpretations. For Chevron interpretations, he would
have courts ask whether "Congress intended to delegate to the
agency the power to interpret with the force of law in the particular

6

The Court in Skidmore suggested that the weight given to an interpretation would

depend on a variety of factors, including, "the thoroughness evident in its consideration,

the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
[other] factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
19 See Weaver, supra note 53, at
7

332 U.S. 194 (1947). In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I) the

Court reversed the Commission's order, and remanded, to the SEC. On remand, the
Commission reached the same result but based its decision on standards contained in the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. The Commission's later decision reached the
Supreme Court on certiorari as Chenery I. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)
(Chenery II).
7, See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 201-03.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 121-38 & 184-92.
71See Anthony, supra note 53.
- See id. at 3 n.4.
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format that was used." 75 He would also require that this delegation
be express: "[The agency] must enjoy a separate delegation of
power to pronounce interpretations with the force of law in the
format it uses.' 76 For Skidmore interpretations, Anthony would
impose few, if any, requirements. Because courts need not actually

defer to such interpretations, there is no reason to demand that
such interpretations be stated in a particular form."
I find Anthony's test unworkable because of his focus on
congressional intent. It is very difficult to know, in a given case,
whether Congress intended for agency interpretations issued in a
particular format to be binding. Congressional intent is an elusive
concept that has been much criticized, and is often difficult to

ascertain.78 There are some instances in which Congress provides

71 Id.

at 4.
at 36.
7 Id. at 3 n.4; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90
CoLt m. L. Rav. 2071, 2093-94 (1990) (footnotes omitted):
Chevron involved a "legislative rule," that is a rule issued by an agency
pursuant to a congressional grant of power to promulgate regulations. For
reasons suggested above, it is plausible to think that the legislative grant of
rulemaking power implicitly carries with it the grant of authority to interpret
ambiguities in the law that the agency is entrusted with administering. Somewhat more broadly, Chevron might be taken to suggest that whenever an
agency is entrusted with implementing power-whether to be exercised through
rulemaking or adjudication-agency interpretations in the course of exercising
that power are entitled to respect so long as they are reasonable.
If this is the basis for Chevron, the principle of deference does not extend
to interpretations by agencies that have not been granted the authority to
interpret the law. For example, agencies that have been entrusted with the
power to prosecute violations but not to make rules lack the pedigree that is
a prerequisite for deference. It follows that even if an agency has been given
the power of interpretation through rulemaking, it is not entitled to deference
if it did not exercise rulemaking power in the particular case. It follows even
more clearly that mere litigating positions are not entitled to deference. And
if this is so, Chevron applies only when an agency is exercising the power to
make rules or otherwise carrying out legislatively delegated interpretive authority.
This basic idea goes a long way toward making sense of the entire dispute
over the reach of Chevron. In a recent case, the Court made precisely this
point, suggesting that a "precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority." Indeed, Justice Scalia, an
enthusiastic defender of the Chevron principle, has argued for a distinction
very much like this one. If agencies are simply interpreting a statute, but have
not been granted the power to "administer" it, the principle of deference
should not apply. And if Chevron does not apply outside of the context of
delegations of law-interpreting power, it is consistent with a well-established
body of previous law.
71 Id.

78

See

ROBERT DICKERSON,

THE

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION Op STATUTES 68
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explicit interpretive authority to igencies and indicates the format
to be used. The obvious example (and perhaps the only one) is
when Congress makes an express delegation to an agency authorizing it to promulgate substantive rules. In most instances, congressional intent is stated vaguely at best. Congress rarely provides
much guidance concerning the form an administrative interpretation should take. It has not, for example, passed a "Deference to
Regulatory Interpretations Act." Thus, most determinations of
congressional intent must be based on a general assessment of
agency authority. But, when this is done, courts sap the force from
a congressional intent theory. Even if Anthony's test were workable, it does not provide a complete solution to the individual
statement problem. As Anthony recognizes, some individual state79
ments may be entitled to deference under his test.
Interestingly, the format debate has been largely ignored by the
lower federal courts. My review of some two hundred or more
cases suggests that, although courts are more deferential to interpretations issued pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority, they
rarely require such authority as a precondition to deference. In
addition, courts rarely inquire whether the agency had a separate
delegation of authority to "pronounce interpretations with the
force of law in the format it uses." 80 Most courts tend to evaluate
administrative interpretations on an ad hoc basis, and they often
fail to distinguish between Chevron interpretations and Skidmore
interpretations.
These evaluations, while not always consistent, tend to fit into
discernible patterns. Courts are more deferential to interpretations

(1975); Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407,
409 (1950) ("[It] is a hallucination, this search for intent. The room is always dark. The
hat we are looking for is often black. If it is there at all, it is on our own head."); Felix

Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rav. 527, 538
(1947) ("Only a day or two ago-when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I
was indiscreet enough to say I don't care what their intention was. I only want to know
what the words mean." (quoting letter from Justice Holmes, addressee unknown)); Warren
Lehman, How To Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 489, 499-501 ("[T]he
intent of the legislature is a phantom because the will of the legislature is a metaphor.");
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. Ray. 863, 870 (1930) ("A legislature
certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men
drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the
approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and
beliefs.").
79 See Anthony, supra note 53, at 51-52.
10Id. at 36.
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stated in legislative rules,8 or final adjudicative decisions. 2 But
courts also sometimes defer to interpretations that are not stated
in these forms, have not received the agency's formal stamp of
approval, and have not been published in accordance with APA
requirements."3 Courts even defer to interpretations that are not

" See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Illinois v. FAA, 832 F.2d 168, 171 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding court bound to defer to reasonable interpretation of statute by agency
administering it and citing Chevron).
11See, e.g., Illinois v. FAA, 832 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
83 Courts rarely deal with the issue expressly. Instead, they defer sub silentio to
unpublished interpretations. See, e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977)
(accepting Navy practice, interpreting Department of Defense regulations, as correct where
not plainly inconsistent with wording of regulations); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969)
(holding agency actions interpreting Immigration and Nationality Act dispositive unless
plainly erroneous); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969) (deferring to and
regarding circular and letters written by HUD staff as proper interpretations of regulation);
Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1945) (treating bulletin issued by
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration as conclusive interpretation of regulation).
In a few cases, litigants have challenged interpretive rules for failure to comply with
APA procedures relating to the issuance of legislative rules. In Deel v. Jackson, 862 F.2d
1079 (4th Cir. 1988), in a somewhat misguided argument, plaintiff urged that deference was
not required because the agency had not embodied its interpretation in the form of a
substantive rule. The court disagreed noting that "[p]romulgation of a regulation, however,
is not a prerequisite for according respect to an agency interpretation." Id. at 1087. The
court went on to note:
In light of the consistency of the Secretary's position, we are persuaded that
it is entitled to the "considerable weight [that] should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer."
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
In a few other cases, courts have held that there are limits on agency authority to act
by interpretation. These cases hold that when an agency issues a rule of general application,
it must do so by legislative rule. See, e.g., Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441,
445-47 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that DOT regulations containing mandatory language and
bright-line tests are legislative rules); First Bancorp. v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434,
438 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Board abused
discretion by making policy through adjudicative order); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d
1008, 1009-1010 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that Ford Motor Co.'s credit policies, which
conformed to industry practices, constituted an unfair trade practice and that the FTC had
abused its discretion in creating the contrary rule adjudicatively: "[A]gencies can proceed
by adjudication to enforce discrete violations of existing laws where the effective scope of
the rule's impact will be relatively small; but an agency must proceed by rulemaking if it
seeks to change the law and establish rules of widespread application"), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 999 (1982); Bellarno Int'l Ltd. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that binding language of FDA Impact Alert makes it a legislative, not interpretive,
rule and thus not subject to notice and comment procedures); Lee v. Kemp, 731 F. Supp.
1101, 1114 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that policies contained in HUD handbook and memoranda had binding effect on decision makers and were thus legislative rules).
Most courts disagree. Agencies can, and frequently do, issue interpretive rules that
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publicly available and that are not necessarily even available in
permanent form.Y Courts have, for example, deferred to interpretations stated in enforcement orders.8 5 In addition, they have con88
87
86
sidered interpretations stated in circulars, affidavits, bulletins,
memoranda, 9 briefs submitted in litigation, 9° as well as statements

have general application. When the United States Supreme Court has dealt with this practice,
it has upheld it. See, e.g., Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294 (allowing NLRB to announce
new principles in adjudicative proceeding); California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S.
366, 371 (1965) (allowing Federal Power Commission to use adjudicatory process to interpret
statute); Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03 (holding it within SEC's discretion to proceed caseby-case rather than through rulemaking procedure). Lower federal courts, in particular,
give agencies much discretion. See,. e.g., Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v.
Community Television of S. Cal., 719 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no abuse of
discretion in Department of Education's choice to enforce statute through adjudication),
cert. denied sub nom., Gottfried v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Nevada Power
Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 927 (10th Cir. 1983) (ruling Department of Interior free to
choose between rulemaking and adjudicative process in applying statute); Viacom Int'l, Inc.
v. FCC, 672 F.2d 1034, 1042 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that choice between rulemaking and
declaratory order is for agency); NLRB v. American Can Co., 658 F.2d 746, 758 (10th Cir.
1981) (allowing administrative agency to rule on question of first impression in adjudicative
process). See generally Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 40
ADmN.L. Ray. 161, 188-90 (1988).
U See, e.g., EhIert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 107 (1971) (applying the deference
rule to sustain a criminal conviction based on an unpublished administrative interpretation).
Is See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
that Mineral Management Service order not to be reversed unless arbitrary or capricious);
Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61, 66 (Ist Cir. 1985) (giving OSHA
citation deference as reasonable interpretation of its regulation); Brennan v. Southern
Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding OSHA citation as controlling
interpretation of regulaton).
See, e.g., University of S. Cal. v. Cost of Living Council, 472 F.2d 1065, 10661068 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972) (deferring to Cost of Living Council and Office of
Emergency Preparedness interpretations of Executive Order, as expressed in circulars), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
"
See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 540
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding denial of summary judgment against the Secretary of the Navy
because appellant submitted affidavits detailing how the Army and Air Force had interpreted
regulatory provisions).
IS See, e.g., Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138 (finding agency Administrator's interpretations
worthy of note but not binding on Court: "He [the Administrator] has set forth his views
... in an interpretive bulletin and in informal rulings. They provide a practical guide to
employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it"); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 722 F. Supp. 998, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that ERISA interpretive bulletin
supported court's interpretation of statute).
11See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 537 (holding memoranda issued by Secretary of Defense and his successor not binding on the courts).
See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988) (deferring to an interpretation
developed in litigation noting that Court was "properly hesitant" to ignore the Secretary's
interpretation); Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan v. USX Corp., 900 F.2d 727, 732
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made orally, 91 or in congressional testimony. 92 In the final analysis,
Diaz's conclusion-that "the case law does not suggest clear standards by which to distinguish the different types of statements"

93

-

is correct.
III.

A Fo1muLA FOR EVALUATION

Any standard for evaluating individual statements must, by
definition, be somewhat vague because of the numerous contexts

in which individual statements are rendered. Ultimately, a reviewing
court must try to determine whether an individual statement is
sufficiently authoritative. Congress delegates administrative au-

thority to agencies, and it is their interpretations*that courts must
n.4 (4th Cir. 1990) (expressing concern about deferring to interpretations rendered by agency
counsel, but deferring to positions taken in an amicus brief concluding that they reflected
the agency's views rather than counsel's); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Sykes, 676
F. Supp. 597, 602-04 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (The Department of Transportation submitted an
amicus brief interpreting and explaining its regulations in private litigation. The court treated
the brief as an administrative interpretation and deferred to the conclusions contained
therein.); see also Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 133 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe Secretary's position on the meaning of the 'individual notice' regulation was not
presented until his reply brief was filed. Because this interpretation apparently has been
developed pendente lite,
the normal canon requiring deference to regulatory interpretations
made by an agency that administers a statute.., has no application here."); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975) (noting deference given to agency
interpretations but rejecting SEC view in amicus brief as contradictory to published Commission release); Gomez v. Department of the Air Force, 869 F.2d 852, 860-61 (5th Cir.
1989) (The court noted the rule of deference and asked the agency to submit supplemental
briefs defining its position. The court considered the briefs, but found them unhelpful.);
McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 1988)
(relying on Government's briefs for interpretation of statutes at issue). But see American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 840 F.2d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (A General Services Administration lawyer offered his interpretation of a rule in a
brief submitted to the Federal Labor Relations Authority. The court concluded that the
interpretation was not binding.); Ames v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 567 F.2d
1174, 1177 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting interpretation offered by agency in amicus brief).
,1See FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438 (1986) (The Court
concluded that the FDIC had a "longstanding and consistent" administrative interpretation.
As proof of that interpretation, the Court pointed to FDIC official's statement made in
conversation with bank official. Ultimately, the Court deferred to the interpretation.).
92 See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1987) (court considered
HUD officials' testimony at congressional hearings); Environmental Defense Fund v. City
of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419, 424 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (involving testimony by EPA's Assistant
Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works.); Harris Trust, 722 F. Supp. at 1018 (involving testimony
by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, for Labor Management Relations, before a House of
Representatives subcommittee); Conoco, Inc. v. Hodel, 626 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Del.
1986) (citing testimony of Department of Interior officials as administrative interpretation).
11648 F. Supp. 638, 645 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
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respect. Thus, if courts defer to individual statements, they can do
so only because the particular official exercised delegated authority,
and did so under circumstances suggesting that deference is appropriate. As a result, Pennzoil's requirement-that interpretations be
"institutional in character" before they are entitled to deference 94seems to provide a necessary gloss on the deference rule.
But, in deciding whether an interpretation is sufficiently institutional, no single factor is critical. A reviewing court must consider the individual's status within the agency. But status, by itself,
is rarely determinative. In some situations, a district director's
interpretation might be entitled to deference. In other situations,
it might be properly disregarded. Courts must, therefore, make a
detailed analysis of the context in which an interpretation was
rendered. They might consider a variety of factors including the
source of the interpretation and the setting in which the statement
was made.
Professor Anthony's recent article95 offers some valuable insights into the problem. He recognizes that courts might justifiably
defer to some individual statements, e.g., those made by the head
of an agency or by his immediate delegates.

96

He also recognizes

that courts might defer to statements by other agency officials as
well. 97 Anthony goes on to suggest other factors by which to
evaluate individual statements, arguing for the consideration of at
least two: "the completeness with which the agency heads themselves may have delegated their powers to the decision maker, and
...

whether all levels of appeal within the agency were exhausted."

This analysis is quite valuable. An analysis of recent decisions
offers much insight into the evaluation process.
Statements by High-Level Officials

A.

Some agency officials have sufficient stature so that their interpretive statements might be regarded as official agency positions.
The range of officials possessing such stature is extremely small.

" See Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1981); supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
"1 See Anthony, supra note 53.
See id. at 51-52.
9

See id. at 52. In reaching this conclusion, Anthony reverts to a congressional intent

analysis. As suggested earlier, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text, this approach
is ill-conceived.
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The head of an agency might be able to speak for an agency, 9 but
it is doubtful that other officials would qualify for deference on
this basis. For example, in a number of cases, courts have refused
to defer to statements by an agency's general counsel. 99 Interpretations by lower-level officials are not entitled to deference on this
basis.
Even when an interpretation is rendered by the head of an
agency, contextual analysis is essential. Deference should not be
automatic. For example, in Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel,10 the
Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) offered
his interpretation of a regulatory provision, and the Department
of the Interior argued that this interpretation was entitled to con-

trolling weight. 01 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that the CEQ
was statutorily authorized to act as a whole and that the Chairman
had no authority to act individuallylea Thus, the court refused to
" See, e.g., Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1988) (In evaluating a
challenged regulation, the Court noted that "[tihe Secretary [of Health and Human Services], who is responsible for enforcing the regulation, does not agree with the strict interpretation adopted by the District Court." The Court stated further: "[W]hen it is the
Secretary's regulation that we are construing, and when there is no claim in this court that
the regulation violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to

substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at
the time of the regulation's promulgation."); see also Calola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding Defense Logistics Agency official's interpretation of regulation
not dispositive because official was not head of the agency).
See Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988) (An agency's general counsel rendered an interpretation to one of the agency's
commissioners. The court refused to treat the interpretation as an "dfficial pronouncement
by the agency of the meaning of... [the] statute."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully, 653 F.2d
497, 501-02 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (An agency's acting general counsel stated his
belief that the act at issue brought about a limited displacement of state law. The court
held that the General Counsel's opinion could not be regarded as the agency's interpretation;
Counsel had not followed the agency's established procedures governing the issuance of
interpretations.), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 245 (1982).
1- 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
101See Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1384 n.10 (9th Cir. 1986).
101See id. The court stated:

Although asked to do so repeatedly at oral argument, the Department was
unable to point to any basis for the Chairman's authority to interpret the
regulations, other than the affidavit of the CEQ's General Counsel stating
that the current CEQ Chairman has assumed sole responsibility for issues
involving NEPA and that the General Counsel consults with the Chairman on
the interpretation of the CEQ regulations. The statute creating the Chairman's
position makes no reference to his duties.... The statute designating the
duties of the Council refers to the Council as a whole .... Executive Order
11991 authorizing the Council to promulgate regulations does not grant the
Chairman any special powers to interpret or administer the regulations....
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defer. It treated the statement as nothing more than the chairman's
personal view. 103
B.

Designation

In some instances, agencies designate officials to make statements on their behalf. Such statements might be made in testimony
before Congress'04 or in judicial proceedings.10 5 In many instances,
the courts have been willing to defer to these statements. For
example, in California v. United States,ee the court deferred to an
affidavit submitted by the manager of the Federal Highway Administration's California Division Office. In the affidavit, the manager stated the agency's position on the regulatory question rather
than his own position.' 7 Similarly, in Vietnam Veterans of America
v. Secretary of the Navy,' °8 plaintiffs argued that the Navy's interpretation of a regulatory provision differed from the Army and
Air Force's interpretation. Plaintiffs based their argument on a
random sampling of comparable cases decided by the Army and
Air Force.' 9 The Navy argued that the three services had acted
consistently, and offered in support affidavits from the President
of the Army's Discharge Review Board (DRB) and the Chief of
the Air Force's DRB." 0 The court accepted the affidavits and
concluded that there was no inconsistency."'
Legitimate questions might be raised about the validity of
decisions like Vietnam Veterans and California v. United States.
In some respects, these decisions seem sound. If the testifying
official does no more than state how the agency has interpreted a

"I The court concluded: "Thus, we are not convinced that the Chairman's interpretation is 'controlling' or correct in this case." Id.
101See Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419, 424 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (involving testimony given by EPA's Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works);
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 998, 1018
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (involving testimony by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, for Labor
Management Relations, before a House of Representatives subcommittee); Conoco, Inc. v.
Hodel, 626 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Del. 1986) (involving testimony by Department of Interior
officials at legislative hearings).
10,See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 540
(D.C. Cir. 1988); California v. United States, 561 F.2d 731, 733 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
10 561 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1977).

See
843
119See
11 See
II See
'0

id. at 733 n.4.
F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
id. at 539-40.
id. at 540.
id.
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regulatory provision, then it would seem that the court is simply
deferring to the agency's interpretation. The individual's statement
then represents nothing more than the format by which the agency
has chosen to reveal its interpretation. On the other hand, how
can the court be sure that the official has accurately stated the
agency's position? When an agency has issued an interpretive ruling

or bulletin, the agency's position is evident. But, an individual's
understanding of agency policy may be flawed. As a result, some
courts are skeptical of testimony or affidavits, especially when they
are offered in contested proceedings. These courts generally require
proof that the agency has taken the stated position and that the
12
employee has accurately stated the content of that position.

C. Other Oral Statements
Courts have also deferred to other oral statements. A good

example is provided by the Supreme Court's holding in FDIC v.
PhiladelphiaGear Corp."' In that case, the agency's interpretation
was not stated in a permanent form, such as a legislative regulation.
However, a bank official had made a statement, setting forth the
agency's position, during a public meeting.11 4 Because the statement
"2Illustrative

is the holding in Ames v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 567
F.2d 1174, 1177 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977):
The Commission filed a brief amicus curiae in which it argues that the
district court was wrong in holding that § 180.3 should not be applied to
disputes arising after the date of the regulation under existing agreements, but
that it was probably right in not applying the regulation to disputes antedating
the regulation, as in this case. We recognize that the Commission staff thought
it easier to argue in favor of retroactive application of the regulation to
preexisting contracts if they surrendered the claim to retroactive application
to preexisting disputes. We do not share their concern.... The Commission
cites no administrative precedent, nor does it suggest that there has been any
practical construction by the Commission which it could urge us to accept on
the ground that the Commission has, in the past, so "interpreted" the regulation. We cannot accept the Commission's current litigating position as an
"interpretation" by the Commission, which the dissenting opinion calls it....
1 476 U.S. 426 (1986).
-,The Court summarized the statement in the following way:
Although the FDIC does not argue that it has an express regulation
excluding a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note
from the definition of "deposit" in 12 U.S.C. § 1813)(1), that exclusion by
the FDIC is nonetheless longstanding and consistent. At a meeting of FDIC
and bank officials shortly after the FDIC's creation, a bank official asked
whether a letter of credit issued by a charge against a customer's account was
a deposit. The FDIC official replied:
"If your letter of credit is issued by a charge against a depositor's account or
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was supported by the agency's claims of consistent application,"
6
and by administrative practice,1 the Court chose to defer."

D.

5

7

Adoption By the Agency

In some instances, agencies adopt individual statements as their
own. For example, in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Hodel,"5s the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, of

for cash and the letter of credit is reflected on your books as a liability, you
do not have a deposit liability. If, on the other hand, you merely extend a
line of credit to your customer, you will only show a contingent liability on
your books. In that event no deposit liability has been created." Transcript
as quoted in FDIC v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
Because Penn Square apparently never reflected the letter of credit here
as a noncontingent liability, and because the interwoven financial instruments
at issue here can be viewed most accurately as the extension of a line of credit
by Penn Square to Orion, this transcript lends support to the FDIC's contention that its longstanding policy has been to exclude standby letters of credit
backed by contingent promissory notes from 12 U.S.C. § 1813()(1)'s definition
of "deposit."
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438 (1986).
" The Court noted:
The FDIC's contemporaneous understanding that standby letters of credit
backed by contingent promissory notes do not generate a "deposit" for
purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)(1) has been fortified by its behavior over the
following decades, the FDIC has asserted repeatedly that it has never charged
deposit insurance premiums on standby letters of credit backed by contingent
promissory notes, and Philadelphia Gear does not contest that assertion.
Id. at 438-39.
116The Court summarized the situation as follows:
Congress requires the FDIC to assess contributions to its insurance fund at a
fixed percentage of a bank's "deposits" under 12 U.S.C. § 1813()(1). See 12
U.S.C. §§ 1817(a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(4)(A). By the time that this suit-the first
challenge to the FDIC's treatment of standby letters of credit backed by
contingent promissory notes-was brought, almost $100 billion in standby
letters of credit was outstanding. See Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Annual Statistical Digest 71 (1983); FDIC, 1983 Statistics on
Banking (Table 10F). The FDIC's failure to levy premiums on standby letters
of credit backed by contingent promissory notes therefore clearly demonstrates
that the FDIC has never considered such letters to reflect deposits.
Id. at 439.
117The Court stated:
Although the FDIC's interpretation of the relevant statute has not been
reduced to a specific regulation, we conclude nevertheless that the FDIC's
practice and belief ... are entitled in the circumstances of this case to the
"considerable weight [that] should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."
Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
"' 882 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the Department of the Interior, rejected a request based on his
interpretation of the agency's operating criteria. The lower court
refused to defer to this interpretation noting that the Regional
Director was "about as low on the bureaucratic totem pole as one
can get for the purpose of rule interpretation.""19 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed, noting that the Regional Director had chaired a committee that recommended the criteria, and that the Secretary's
"vigorous defense of that interpretation in the court below and in
this court" suggested that the agency had adopted the interpretation. 2 0 Of course, the interpretation might have been upheld on
the basis that the official decided a contested case and, therefore,
exercised delegated authority.
E. ALJ Interpretations
How should the interpretation of an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) be treated? Some courts regard such interpretations as authoritative,12 1 but the law in this area is complex, and can vary
from agency to agency. In the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), ALJ decisions are reviewable by the agency's
Appeals Council. Although an AL's determination might ordinarily be accorded considerable weight, a conflicting interpretation
by the Council will override it.'2 Under OSHA regulations, a
hearing officer's decision that is not reviewed by the full Commission is not treated as binding precedent,'21 and it does not "nec-

"I Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 370 (9th Cir. 1989).
,2 See id.

21 See, e.g., Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
861 F.2d 936, 939 (6th Cir. 1988) (Secretary issued a citation for a serious violation based

on his interpretation of regulatory requirements. The ALJ ultimately affirmed the Secretary's

interpretation.).
"2 See, e.g., Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984). In Baker, the
court stated:
The Secretary has chosen to act through the Appeals Council, and therefore
it is the Council's decision that must be deferred to by the courts if substantial
evidence exists to support it, whatever the result might have been if the courts

were reviewing the ALJ's decision directly.
Id. at 1150; see also Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding
Council's denial of disability benefits to claimant when sufficient evidence supported the
refusal).
'1 See In re Cerro Copper Prod. Co., 752 F.2d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding

unreviewed ALJ decision not binding precedent for OSHRC or the courts); Willamette Iron
& Steel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 604 F.2d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that hearing

officer decision lacking full commission review does not constitute precedent binding the
commission), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980).
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essarily [express] the views of the Commissioners, or [declare]
Commission policy."' 24

Even when agency regulations or practices do not preclude
deference to ALJ interpretations, some courts are reluctant to treat

such interpretations as controlling. For example, in Donovan v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,- 5 a commission failed to review an ALJ's
decision. Nevertheless, the court held that the ALJ's decision did
not constitute binding precedent.1 26 It did not "necessarily [express]
the views of the Commissioners or [declare] Commission policy.' ' 27
In Kwan v. Donovan,- the Secretary's interpretation was both
"reasonable and consistent with the statute."' 129 The ALJs had,

however, rendered inconsistent interpretations. The court chose to
defer to the agency's interpretation, noting that the "fact that

administrative law judges within the Department of Labor may
have employed inconsistent interpretations of business necessity
prior to the promulgation of the Secretary's interpretation is irrel30
evant."M

In each case, judicial evaluation of ALJ interpretations is heavily dependent on context. In most instances, if an ALJ's decision
becomes final, courts will treat that decision as the agency's inter-

pretation and will defer.' 3' Of course, if the agency reviews and
overturns the decision, the ALJ's interpretation does not constitute

12

Willamette Iron, 604 F.2d at 1180 (citation omitted).

" 666 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1981).
'2s See Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1981); see also
RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 571 n.13 (6th Cir. 1979) ("RMI has argued
that this determination was unreasonable as contrary to numerous ALJ decisions. The
OSHRC is not bound by unreviewed ALJ decisions so we see no merit to this argument.").
I2 Anheuser-Busch, 666 F.2d at 326 (quoting Willamette Iron, 604 F.2d at 1180
(citation omitted)). The Anheuser-Busch court also noted that deference might not be
required because the ALJ was interpreting judicial precedent rather than a statute or
regulation. See id.
1 777 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1985).
229 Kwan v. Donovan, 777 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1985).
M'Id. The court went on to state: "With the great deference we accord an agency's

interpretation of its own regulations, we must reject Kwan's argument." Id.
132See, e.g., Fluor Constructors,861 F.2d at 939 ("The ALJ affirmed the violation.
After the Commission failed to direct discretionary review, the ALJ's Decision and Order
became the final order of the Commission .... "); Oakland County Bd. of Comm'rs v.
Department of Labor, 853 F.2d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The ALJ's decision and order
is the final decision of the Secretary unless the nonprevailing party files exceptions .... [I]f
exceptions are filed, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Secretary
unless the Secretary notifies the parties ... that the case has been accepted for review.");
Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Const. Co., 746 F.2d 894, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The ALJ decision
became a final order when no Commissioner directed review.").
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the agency's position.12 In some circumstances, even though it
appears that an AL's interpretation has been affirmed, it will be
entitled to little weight. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission,' the Secretary of Labor
cited petitioner for a non-serious safety violation. 13 4 An ALJ decision confirming the citation interpreted the regulation in question.
The Commission sustained the decision.'35 As a result, it seemed
that the Commission had confirmed the AL's interpretation. That
was not the case. Of the three commissioners, one recused himself
and the other two were equally divided on the interpretive question. 13 6 The agency's position was further muddled by the fact that,
in a prior case, a divided Commission had decided the interpretive
question the opposite way.1 37 The court concluded that the agency
had not taken an authoritative position and decided to interpret
3
the regulation itself.1 1
F.

Litigative Interpretations

Courts have experienced particular problems with litigative interpretations. These statements take many forms. Agency attorneys
"3See,

e.g., Baker, 730 F.2d at 1150 (Administrative law judge initially decided a

case, but was overruled by the agency's Appeals Council. The court noted that, had the
Appeals Council not decided to review the matter, the AL's determination would have
been final and would have represented the agency's interpretation of the provision in
question. But, when the Appeals Council reversed, its interpretation became the agency's
position. Thus, the Appeals Council's interpretation was the one entitled to deference.).
13 573 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1978).
'34 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 573
F.2d 157, 158 (3d Cir. 1978).
135See id.
236 See id. at 163 n.4.
I3 See id. at 163.
238 The holding in Bethlehem Steel is incorrect. The case involved the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, which is jointly administered by the Secretary of Labor and the
Commission. Even though the Commission could not agree regarding the regulation's
meaning, the Secretary of Labor had interpreted the provision. In Martin v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission,
- U.S.
-, I11 S. Ct. 1171 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Commission was required to defer to a reasonable
interpretation by the Secretary of Labor. See id. at
-,
111 S. Ct. at 1180-1181. In
Bethlehem Steel, the court ignored the Secretary's interpretation. For an examination of the
Martin decision, see Inter-Agency Conflicts, supra note 8.
If a different regulatory scheme had been involved, one which did not involve a
division of authority between two different agencies, the decision would have made sense.
If only two commissioners decided the case, and they were equally divided, then it is
difficult to argue that the Commission had decided the regulation's meaning. This is
particularly true given that the only prior decision involved a split decision interpreting the
regulatory provision the opposite way.

1991-921

REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS

1013

construe regulatory provisions in briefs, 139 and other officials submit affidavits or testify regarding their interpretations of regulatory
provisions."40 The federal courts have generally been skeptical of
litigative interpretations and have been reluctant to defer.141 In
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,42 the United States
Supreme Court flatly stated that it had "never applied" the def-

erence rule to litigative interpretations.

43

Despite this statement, in

119See, e.g., Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d
1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (attorney submitted an amicus brief on behalf of an agency
that purported to alter the agency's interpretation of a regulation), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1055 (1990); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 840
F.2d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (General Services Administration lawyer offered his interpretation of a rule in a brief submitted to the Federal Labor Relations Authority.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990).
,,o
See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 540 ("Appellant submitted evidence to the
contrary in the form of affidavits of the President of the Army's DRB and the Chief of
the Air Force's DRB."); Californiav. United States, 561 F.2d at 733 n.4 (involving affidavit
submitted by the administration manager of the California Division Office, Federal Highway
Administration); Environmental Defense Fund, 727 F. Supp. at 424 (involving testimony
given by EPA's Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response before
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works); Harris Trust, 722 F. Supp. at
1018 (involving testimony by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, for Labor Management
Relations, before a House of Representatives subcommittee).
"I See Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1455
(The court identified two principal reasons for reluctance to defer to agency counsel's
position. First, the position by counsel may not reflect the views of the agency head(s).
Second, a position established solely in litigation may have been developed too quickly.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 840 F.2d at 952
(General Services Administration lawyer offered his interpretation of a rule in a brief
submitted to the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Court concluded that it need not treat
the interpretation as binding: "The GSA brief is not ... an official position .... [I]t
plainly lacks the credentials of a position that agency heads have staked out after adjudicative or rulemaking procedures allowing a full vetting of alternatives."); Ames, 567 F.2d
at 1177 n.3 ("We cannot accept the Commission's current litigating position as an 'interpretation' by the Commission."); see also Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan v. USX
Corp., 900 F.2d 727, 732 n.4 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[W]hile the views of an agency as expressed
in its rulings, regulations, and administrative practice are generally entitled to deference,
the views of an agency's appellate counsel, unsupported by official agency pronouncements,
are not accorded deference."); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("There is some question, to begin with, whether an interpretive theory put forth
only by agency counsel in litigation, which explains agency action that could be explained
on different theories, constitutes an 'agency position' for purposes of Chevron."), aff'd,
484 U.S. 9 (1987); Nordell v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("To carry much
weight, however, the interpretation must be publicly articulated some time prior to the
agency's embroilment in litigation over the disputed provision.").
1,2
488 U.S. 204 (1988).
" See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988). However, in
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985), the Supreme Court accepted a litigative interpretation.
Dissenting Justice Brennan objected, noting that "[b]ecause this interpretation apparently
has been developed pendente lite, the normal canon requiring deference to regulatory
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at least two instances, the Supreme Court has accepted litigative
interpretations. 144 In Gardebring v. Jenkins,145 the Supreme Court
deferred to an interpretation developed in litigation, noting that it
was "properly hesitant" to ignore the Secretary's interpretation.'46
In Atkins v. Parker, 47 the Supreme Court also accepted an interpretation developed during the course of litigation. 48 Lower courts
as well have deferred to litigative interpretations.149 In Masters,
Mates & Pilots Pension Plan v. USX Corp.,150 the Fourth Circuit
expressed its concern about deferring to interpretations rendered
by agency counsel' but deferred to positions taken in an amicus
brief concluding that those positions reflected the agency's views
53
rather than counsel's.1 2 In Gomez v. Departmentof the Air Force,
the court noted the rule of deference and asked the agency to

interpretations made by an agency that administers a statute ... has no application here."
Id. at 133 n.3 (citations omitted). He went on to state:
The record contains no evidence that food stamp program authorities
have ever advanced a particular construction of the phrase prior to the litigation. Indeed, in his opening brief to this Court, the Secretary did not address
the regulatory argument, but contended instead that "any argument, independent of the constitutional argument, that the Massachusetts notice was in
violation of the Food Stamp Act or the 'mass change' regulations" should be
left open to the recipients on remand. Brief for Federal Respondent 44, n.38.
Thus the Secretary's position on the meaning of the "individual notice"
regulation was not presented until his reply brief was filed.
Id.
" See Gardebring, 485 U.S. 415; Atkins, 472 U.S. 115.
I' 485 U.S. 415 (1988).
" The Court stated:
We recognize that the Secretary had not taken a position on this question
until this litigation. However, when it is the Secretary's regulation that we are
construing, and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation
violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to
substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative
reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications
of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation.
Id. at 429-30.
.,7 472 U.S. 115 (1985).

I" See id. at 183 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,41See, e.g., Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Sykes, 676 F. Supp. 597, 602-04
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (The Department of Transportation submitted amicus curiae brief interpreting and explaining its regulations in private litigation. The court treated the brief as an
administrative interpretation and deferred to the conclusions contained therein.).
900 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1990).
' See id. at 732 n.4.
" See id. The court noted that "the PBGC, with their amicus curiae brief, has

provided us with a sextant, enabling us to navigate our journey into uncharted, treacherous
seas." Id.
"1 869 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1989).
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submit supplemental briefs defining its position. 5 4 The court considered the briefs, but found them unhelpful.15 5
The inconsistencies between these various lines of decision are
partially explainable. Courts do reject litigative interpretations in
most instances. The Supreme Court is particularly reluctant to defer
to litigating positions that represent nothing more than counsel's
post hoc rationalizations for agency action. 156 As the Court recognized in Chenery 11,157 a reviewing court "must judge the propriety of ... [agency] action solely by the grounds invoked by the
agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is
powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what
it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis."' 58 Thus, courts
view litigative interpretations skeptically, fearing that counsel may
have developed an interpretation outside established procedures in
59
an effort to gain litigative advantage.
The Court's reluctance to defer to litigative interpretations is
premised on other considerations as well. As the Supreme Court
noted in Bowen, it has consistently declined to defer to an agency
counsel's interpretation of a statute when the agency itself has
articulated no position on the question. 16 The Court justified this
position on the ground that "Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility
for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.' ' 6' Moreover,
when courts defer to counsel's arguments, there is a significant risk

'-,

See Gomez v. Department of the Air Force, 869 F.2d 852, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1989).

is See id.

In Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), Justice Marshall dissenting, argued:
Because the substantive criteria for parole have not changed during the course
of this litigation, . . ., the Solicitor General's representations are flatly inconsistent with the Government's own position at trial; they reflect nothing but
a change in the Government's litigation strategy. This is precisely the sort of
post hoc rationalization that is entitled to no weight.
Id. at 866 n.5.
M"332 U.S. 194 (1947).
Id. at 196.
'59 In FederalLabor Relations Authority v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1455,
the court noted: "[A] position established only in litigation may have been developed
hastily, or under special pressure, or without an adequate opportunity for presentation of
conflicting views. Indeed, where statutes specify procedures for a specific type of decision,
one engendered solely in litigation will (typically) have skirted those procedures. . .
" See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212-13.
161 Id.
at 212 (quoting Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628
(1971)).
-6
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that the interpretation might not be followed
or given credence by
162
the agency itself in subsequent cases.
When a "litigating position" does not involve counsel's post
hoc rationalization, deference may be appropriate. In Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the Supreme
Court deferred to an interpretation contained in a citation.1 63 The

Court rejected respondent's argument that the citation represented
nothing more than the agency's "litigating position," and was

therefore "undeserving of judicial deference."' 1 4 The Court began
by reaffirming the general rule that "agency 'litigating positions'

are not entitled to deference when they are merely appellate coun-

sel's 'post hoc rationalizations' for agency action, advanced for
the first time in the reviewing court."'1 65 But, the Court emphasized

"1 As the court stated in FederalLabor RelationsAuthority v. Department of Treasury,
884 F.2d at 1455 (citations omitted):
We can identify two basic concerns for reluctance to defer to agency counsel's
litigating position. First, the position may not reflect the views of the agency
head(s). Judicial reliance on such a position might (in the statutory interpretation context) lock an agency into a view it never espoused ....
That risk
may have been especially acute before Chevron made crystal clear that an
agency interpreting a statute under an express or implied delegation of authority is free to modify its view. Quite apart from the potential lock-in, an
agency informed that its stated reason was inadequate might reverse field;
judicial affirmance on a basis never articulated by the agency could thus
produce an unintended result and usurp the agency's function....
163See Martin,
U.S. at -, I11 S. Ct. at 1180.
16 Id. at
I,IlI S. Ct. at 1178.
"6 Id.
at
, 111 S. Ct. at 1179. In Jean, Justice Marshall, dissenting, complained
about the court's reliance on a litigative interpretation. The Court had relied on statements
made by counsel in oral argument before the Supreme Court. Marshall began by recognizing
that, under Chevron, reasonable interpretations are entitled to a presumption of deference
from the courts. But, he then noted that "[t]hese presumptions do not apply, however, to
representations of appellate counsel," and to "appellate counsel's interpretation of regulations." He explained: "Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to
appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands. It is
the administrative official and not appellate counsel who possess [sic] the expertise that can
enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and intent of Congress." (quoting
Investment Co., 401 U.S. at 628). Jean, 472 U.S. at 865 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall believed that the majority in Jean had violated these principles. He
emphasized that counsel's representations were "not supported by citation to any authoritative statement by the Attorney General or the INS." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Marshall observed that 'except for some too-late formulations, apparently coming from
the Solicitor General's office,' we have been directed to no relevant indication that the
administrative practice was to prohibit such distinctions." Id. at 865-66 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 422 (1971)).
Marshall concluded that the "Solicitor General's contention to the contrary is merely an
unsupported assertion by counsel for a litigant; this Court owes it no deference at all." Id.
at 866 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that the prohibition against litigative interpretations applies only
when an interpretation is advanced "after agency proceedings have
terminated," rather than as part of an "exercise of the agency's
delegated lawmaking powers."' The Court concluded that deference was due the Secretary's citation because it "is agency action,
7
not a post hoc rationalization of it. '"16
Courts might consider litigative interpretations for other purposes as well. In some instances, an agency's final decision is met
with claims of inconsistency. In other words, the challenging party
argues that the agency has taken inconsistent positions, making the
interpretation not entitled to deference. In this instance, counsel
might supplement the record with proof of consistent application.
This was done in Vietnam Veterans,1 6 which is discussed earlier. 6 9
There, plaintiffs argued that the Navy's interpretation of a regulatory provision differed from the Army's and Air Force's interpretation, 70 and the services offered affidavits to prove that they
7
had acted consistently.1 '
Some decisions go further, accepting counsel's interpretation
of regulatory provisions to the extent that counsel does no more
than state the agency's considered position regarding a provision's
meaning. 72 They usually do so when the agency's interpretation
predates the litigation. 73 But, in order to ensure that a particular
interpretation is not a post hoc rationalization, these courts require
proof that the interpretation represents the agency's previously
adopted position. 7 4 In Bowen, even though the Court rejected a

11 Martin,

Id.

-

U.S. at

-,

I11 S. Ct. at 1179.

167

168843 F.2d 528.
169See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
170See Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 540.
171See id.
'7 See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212. The Bowen Court noted: "We have never applied the
[deference] principle ... to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by
regulations, rulings, or administrative practice." Id.
"I See Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1455
(adopting counsel's interpretation because it was consistent with prior administrative construction).
174See Ames, 567 F.2d at 1177 n.3:
The Commission filed a brief amicus curiae in which it argues that the
district court was wrong in holding that § 180.3 should not be applied to
disputes arising after the date of the regulation under existing agreements, but
that it was probably right in not applying the regulation to disputes antedating
the regulation, as in this case. We recognize that the Commission staff thought
it easier to argue in favor of retroactive application of the regulation to
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litigative interpretation, it limited its holding to "agency litigating

positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or
administrative practice." 175 Other courts have rendered similar
holdings. For example, in Federal Labor Relations Authority v.
Department of Treasury,176 the court treated an interpretation sub-

mitted in an amicus brief in a prior case as the agency's interpre17
tation.177 But, the interpretation was adopted after due deliberation 1
and had been confirmed by the agency head. 179 As a result, the

court chose to treat the interpretation as official.8 0
Courts that refuse to defer to litigative interpretations offered
by counsel may, perhaps, "consider"

those interpretations (Skid-

more deference) in appropriate cases. In most cases, unless the
agency's decision can stand on its own merits, counsel's interpre-

tation will be rejected under Chenery L111 But, if the interpretation
is offered under circumstances that do not implicate Chenery I,
some courts will "consider" counsel's arguments. Obviously, when

preexisting contracts if they surrendered the claim to retroactive application
to preexisting disputes. We do not share their concern. The Commission cites
no administrative precedent, nor does it suggest that there has been any
practical construction by the Commission which it could urge us to accept on
the ground that the Commission has, in the past, so "interpreted" the regulation. We cannot accept the Commission's current litigating position as an
"interpretation" by the Commission, which the dissenting opinion calls it....
115Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212-13.
116884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1455.
" The court noted:
[W]e find nothing to justify such a concern. The way in which Director
Homer adopted the brief as the officiai OPM statement seems in no respect
to fail short of OPM's usual procedures for interpreting its routine use notice.
Guidelines in the Federal Personnel Manual are drafted by OPM staff and
approved by the Director, see Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter 711 at §
2.6(1) (June 24, 1986). This seems functionally indistinguishable from the legal
staff's preparing the amicus brief and Director Homer's officially adopting it
in her letter of June 25, 1987. Thus we have no reason to believe that the
interpretive process here was any less thorough, less formal or less open than
it would normally be. Nor, of course, did the position represent any kind of
agency switch.
Id.
179The court noted:
Ms. Homer, the agency head, has explicitly adopted the view of the amicus
brief. There is no risk that counsel may have acted as "mavericks disembodied
from the agency that they represent."
Id. (quoting Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 165 (Silberman, J., concurring)).
"IsSee id. at 1456 ("Thus, we believe it entirely appropriate to treat Mr. [sic] Homer's
adoption of the amicus brief as an authoritative expression of the agency's views.").
"I See supra note 70.
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counsel's interpretation differs from the agency's interpretation,
counsel's interpretation will be viewed with suspicion and probably
will be rejected.8 2 But, when the agency has not previously interpreted the regulation, at least one court has concluded that counsel's interpretation is entitled to a "modicum of respect."'8 3
G.

Miscellaneous Statements

Subordinates make interpretive statements in a variety of other
contexts. In some instances, courts have deferred to these statements. However, in most of these instances, the subordinate has
exercised delegated authority and has rendered a final decision on
8"
the agency's behalf. For example, Keeffe v. Library of Congress'

involved the Library of Congress's conflict of interest regulations
as interpreted by the Director of the Library's Congressional Research Service. The District of Columbia Circuit treated the Director's interpretation as the agency's interpretation: "We win not
disturb the reasonable judgment of an agency of Congress as to

the meaning of its own regulations."'

5

In Diaz v. INS,1 6 the court

indicated that it would have deferred to a District Director's inter18 7
pretation had it been reasonable.

One of the most interesting cases is CaliforniaMolasses Co. v.
California& Hawaiian Sugar Co.' This case, in which the court

deferred to conclusions -reached by IRS field auditors, pushes the

11 A court will reject counsel's interpretation when it conflicts with the agency's
construction of a regulation. See Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 162 n.4 ("[Deference
cannot be given when] counsel's interpretation in fact does not explain agency action but
is, to the contrary, incompatible with the agency's settled course of conduct. That is the
situation here. .. ").
,a' American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 840 F.2d at 952:
[Counsel's interpretation] plainly lacks the credentials of a position that agency
heads have staked out after adjudicative or rulemaking procedures allowing a
full vetting of alternatives.... Although we believe the GSA legal opinion
certainly entitled to a modicum of respect, the exact degree is no matter as
we believe its construction to be decidedly the better view.
777 F.2d 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1578; see also Ganadera Indus., S.A. v. Block, 727 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (addressing situation where Department of Agriculture official withdrew appellant's privilege to import meat into the United States based on his own interpretation of
regulatory requirements). But see Calola, 851 F.2d at 399 (holding that "deference is
inappropriate" and noting, inter alia, that "the only agency official to construe [the
regulation] was ... the DLA's debarring official, not the head of the agency").
16 648 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
' See id. at 649.
"n 551 F.2d 1230 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
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concept of deference to its limits. The audit was supervised by an
agent with thirteen years experience and two years of audit supervision experience. The auditors found that the California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. was in compliance with regulatory requirements,
and that finding was given deference by the court.8 9 In deciding
to defer, the court rejected claims that "the IRS rulings were
routine reviews by local personnel and accordingly were of a type
or level not entitled to the deference customarily given to administrative agency determinations."'' 90 The court emphasized that the
IRS "was charged with enforcing the price controls and its agents
did have delegated authority and expertise in reviewing price control compliance.' 91
Whether the California Molasses decision makes sense is debatable. The decision is justifiable in that the auditors acted under
delegated authority, and their interpretation definitively resolved a
matter within their authority. As a result, their interpretation was
like ALJ decisions interpreting regulatory provisions, and should
be analyzed in a comparable way. Deference is appropriate because
the auditors' interpretation became the agency's interpretation. The
audit reports were forwarded to the IRS's district office, which
affirmed the decision. That office made its decision without forwarding reports to the agency's national office. 92 Of course, if
agencies allow auditors or those in district offices to make final
interpretive decisions, then it will be difficult for those agencies to
maintain control over the interpretation of their governing statutes
and regulations. However, if the agency desires more control, and
consistency of application, it can achieve these goals by undertaking
national review of decisions by subordinates.
H.

Informal Advice

Subordinate agency officials give informal advice to regulated
entities, but few courts are willing to treat such advice as authoritative. 93 This approach is sound. The Pennzoil case, which is

"'

See California Molasses Co. v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 551 F.2d 1230,

1234-39.
110
Id. at 1235.
191Id.
19

Id.

,93See Miller, 440 U.S. at 144 n.25 (A regional official sent an interpretation to state
officials that had not been approved by the agency's national office. Later, HEW issued
instructions that were contrary to the letter. The Court concluded that the Instructions were
"the agency's first and only national interpretation" of the relevant provision.).
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discussed earlier, 194 presents this problem. There, several subordinate officials made interpretive statements. The court correctly
refused to treat those interpretations as authoritative.
IV.

COLLATERAL USES

When individual statements do not qualify for deference, that
does not mean that they will be disregarded. Courts might use
those statements in various ways.
A.

Respect

In an appropriate case, even though an interpretation is not
regarded as "official" and therefore entitled to deference, it might
nonetheless be "considered" by a court and given a "modicum of
respect." 1 95 In Copperweld Corp. v. United States,1 9 a general
counsel's statement failed to qualify as an "official pronouncement
1
by the agency [interpreting] the meaning of ... [the] statute." 9
But, the court still concluded that the statement could be regarded
as "persuasive authority."1 98 Of course, judicial treatment of any
interpretation will depend on circumstances. Courts do not routinely respect every statement by an agency official. On the contrary, they weigh the significance of the statement.
B.

Vagueness

Some courts will consider individual statements when a regulatory provision suffers from vagueness or ambiguity. In L.R.
Willson & Sons, Inc. v. Donovan,'9 petitioner was cited for a
violation of OSHA regulations and defended on the ground that
the regulation was impermissibly vague. The court agreed, basing
its decision, in part, on statements by subordinate OSHA offi-

' See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.

American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 840 F.2d
947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1988):
[Counsel's interpretation] plainly lacks the credentials of a position that agency
heads have staked out after adjudicative or rulemaking procedures allowing a
full vetting of alternatives.... Although we believe the GSA legal opinion
certainly entitled to a modicum of respect, the exact degree is no matter as
we believe its construction to be decidedly the better view.
196682 F. Supp. 552, "564 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
19 Id.
,"Id.
685 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
"'
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cials. 210 The court placed particular emphasis on the fact that those
officials had disagreed regarding the meaning of regulatory requirements, 20 ' and found their disagreements to be particularly significant because "the regulations involved teeter[ed] precariously on
the edge of the wall that divides adequate notice from impermissible
vagueness. '" The court concluded that the regulation did "not
20 3
adequately express" the agency's intent.

C. Deciding Whether to Defer
Courts have also considered individual statements in deciding
whether an agency's seemingly authoritative interpretation of a
regulatory provision deserves deference.2 04 Such use of individual
statements would seem to be inappropriate. When an administrative
agency has authoritatively interpreted a regulatory provision, it
should make little difference that a subordinate official disagrees
with the agency's interpretation. 205 Within an agency, numerous
subordinates may work on a regulatory scheme, and some of them
are bound to disagree with the agency's interpretation. Under the
deference rule, agencies are free to exercise discretion in their
interpretation and application of regulatory provisions. As one
court stated, an agency's interpretation "need not be the only
reasonable one before we will sustain it. '"2 As a result, the fact

200

20

See L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 664, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The court summarized the disagreement as follows:

[T]he record shows some disagreement on this issue between the compliance
officers who conducted the inspection of Willson's worksite. It is uncontested
that during the initial visit in February the OSHA officers informed James
Willson that if either safety belts or safety nets were utilized he would be in
compliance with the Act. At the hearing, however, one of the officers testified
that both nets and safety belts were required.
Id. at 675 (footnotes omitted).
2 Id.
at 676.
203

Id.

204 See

Russell L. Weaver, Contemporaneous Construction Discovery: Its Use and

Abuse, 20 WAxa FOREST L. Rv. 367, 368 (1984) [hereinafter ContemporaneousConstruc-

tion Discovery].
10 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 171 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1982) ("[O]pinions are to be given little weight, as such, unless they are institutional
in character."), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983).
200 Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 861
F.2d 936, 940 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Cook v. Director, Workers' Compensation Programs,816 F.2d 1182, 1187 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[C]Iose cases of interpretation of an administrative regulation must be resolved in favor of the administrator's interpretation .... );
Brock v. Schwarz-Jordan, Inc., 777 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[B]ecause the secretary's
interpretation is a reasonable interpretation and is entitled to great weight, it is dispositive
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that a subordinate disagrees with the agency's choice should be

irrelevant.
But, individual statements cannot be dismissed so easily. Even
though agencies are free to exercise latitude in their interpretation
and application of regulatory provisions, they do not have unbridled discretion. As Justice Scalia recently recognized: "[D]eference
is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency
interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of
construction courts normally employ." ' Courts can overturn regulatory interpretations for a variety of reasons, 2 8 and they are

of this case."); Cranston v. Clark, 767 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Even if the
agency's interpretation is not the only one permitted by the language of the regulation,
where it is a reasonable interpretation, courts must respect it."); Marshall v. Whirlpool
Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1979) ("An administrative officer ... may adopt
regulations so long as they are reasonable and consistent with the intention of Congress as
expressed by the statute."), aff'd, 445 U.S. 1, (1980).
20 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., -

U.S.

..

.. 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237

(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Scalia would have applied deference principles, but rejected
the agency's interpretation because it was unreasonable.).
An interpretation might, for example, be overturned if it conflicts with the language
of the agency's governing statute, see United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (holding that the Army Corps' interpretation of "waters of the United
States" could not conflict with the expressed intent of Congress); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that when
Congress has explicitly addressed a particular issue, an agency may not differ from its
desires); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (holding that "quasi-legislative
authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such
power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes"), or its own
regulations, see Stone v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (the court noted
that the "Tax Court is of course free to make its own rules" regarding the scope of review
to be applied to trial judges rulings. However, "until the court adopts new language, it
must hew to the meaning of what it has said."); Fluor Constructors,861 F.2d at 939 ("An
agency is bound by the regulations it promulgates and may not attempt to circumvent the
amendment process through changes in interpretation unless supported by the language of
the regulation."); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328-29, 1331-32 (9th
Cir. 1982) (concluding that agency was attempting to amend an informal rule by adjudicative
interpretation and holding that agency had acted improperly); Bahat v. Sureck, 637 F.2d
1315, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted) ("[W]e question the authority of the BIA
to amend the regulation by adjudication to include essentially the same provisions that were
rejected by the Commissioner in promulgating the regulation. It is the Commissioner who
is given the primary function of promulgating regulations. That authority should not be
nullified by the adjudicatory arm of the INS."); United States v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.,
563 F.2d 1008, 1011-13 (10th Cir. 1977) (The court believed that the FAA was acting
inconsistently with its informal rule and concluded that the agency did not have the right
to undertake such action adjudicatively.); see also Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 513 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1975) ("If the Secretary desires by this
regulation to achieve certain goals which he deems consistent with the purpose of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act but which the wording of the regulation, as interpreted
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often inclined to do so when an agency has applied its interpretations inconsistently.2 For example, in North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell,210 the Supreme Court rejected an administrative
interpretation. The agency had changed its interpretation of a
regulation several times and had even changed it during the course
of the judicial proceedings. 21' The Court concluded that there was
no interpretation to which to defer. 2 Thus, courts can consider
individual statements in determining whether the agency has acted
consistently.
The validity of considering subordinate statements for this purpose might be questioned in light of more recent decisions. The
courts have always recognized that agencies are free to alter their
interpretations, provided they give a reasoned explanation for their
change of position. In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed these basic principles. 213 As the Court stated in Rust v.

by the Commission, will not justify, he should amend or clarify it.").
An interpretation might also be overturned if it conflicts with the regulation's purpose.
See, e.g., Fluor Constructors,861 F.2d at 941 (citation omitted) (The court rejected such
an argument, noting that "the Commission's interpretation of the regulation better serves
the remedial purposes of the Occupational Safety and Health Act." The court noted further,
"While the plain meaning of the regulation's words should not be strained to alleviate a
safety hazard,. . . we refuse to set aside a reasonable interpretation by the Commission
which effectuates the Act's purpose of protecting the health of workers."); Hart v. Bowen,
799 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Secretary's interpretation of the regulation as
applied in this situation is unreasonable because it contravenes the purpose behind the
Home Exclusion Rule."); North Ga. Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Goldschmidt, 621 F.2d 697,
710-11 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting agency's interpretation based, in part, on the fact that it
would "undermine" the purpose of the regulation); see also Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853 F.2d
858, 861 (1lth Cir. 1988) (noting that the court "need not accept an agency's interpretation
that frustrates the underlying congressional policy"); New York State Dep't of Social
Services v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) ("The deference
ordinarily due the federal agency charged with interpreting a statute is unnecessary and
inappropriate here where HHS's interpretation is not only inconsistent with the language of
the Medicaid statute and its purpose .... but also in defiance of common sense.").
21 See, e.g., Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 398-401 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (An agency
treated individuals involved in a single transaction differently. Some were debarred from
contracting with the government for a period of three years; one was not debarred. The
court refused to defer, noting that it could find no basis for distinguishing between the
individuals.).
210456 U.S. 512 (1982).
211See North Haven Bd. of Educ.
212 See id.
213See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442

v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982).

U.S. 347 (1979) (The Court considered an advisory
guideline issued by the Council on Environmental Quality, interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act. That interpretation was issued because the President had ordered the
Council to review its guidelines and transform them into mandatory regulations. During the
review process, the agency changed its interpretation. Because the Council was able to
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Sullivan, 214 "This Court has rejected the argument that an agency's
interpretation 'is not entitled to deference because it represents a

sharp break with prior interpretations' of the statute in question. ' ' 215 The Court went on to state that '[a]n initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.'

26

"An agency is

not required to 'establish rules of conduct to last forever,"' but
rather must be allowed to 'adapt [its] rules and policies to the
demands of changing circumstances.' "217
Nevertheless, most courts will review agency changes in position
more closely. 2 8 By changing its position, the agency indicates uncertainty about the provision's meaning. Even though the agency
may be able to justify its change of position, many courts will
carefully scrutinize the agency's interpretation to see whether the
later interpretation should be upheld. Moreover, in some cases,
regulated entities mount "retroactivity" challenges. These challenges are possible because agencies usually seek to apply their
interpretations retroactively. 2 9 When an agency changes its inter-

justify the second interpretation, the Supreme Court chose to accept it.); National Muffler
Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 480-84 (1979) (accepting Tax Commissioner's evolving interpretation of the "business league" exemption as natural result of
novel claims); see also General Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872 F.2d 1048, 1059-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990) (accepting inconsistent interpretation of
statute because reinterpretation was "permissible and rationally explained"); Jets Servs.,
Inc. v. Hoffman, 420 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1976) ("An administrative agency is
not bound to an interpretation or guideline when it becomes evident from experience that
changes are required to keep pace with present conditions." The court went on to observe
that if the agency were required to adhere to its prior interpretation, "it would lose its
necessary discretionary flexibility to act in its field of expertise, and would become burdened
with fossilized errors.").
, Il1 S.

214_

U.S. _

215 Rust

v. Sullivan,

Ct. 1759 (1991).

-U.S.

-,

-

, Il

S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991) (quoting

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862); see also Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc.,
- U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535 (1991) (rejecting claim that "deference is inappropriate ... because
... interpretation has changed without explanation").
216 Rust,
- U.S. at -, li S. Ct. at 1769 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-

64).

217 Id., 111 S. Ct. at 1769 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). The Court concluded "that the Secretary amply
justified his change of interpretation with a 'reasoned analysis.".' Id. at __,
Ill S. Ct.
at 1791 (quoting Motor Vehicles, 463 U.S. at 42); see also Bethenergy Mines, - U.S. at
_, 111 S. Ct. at 2534 (holding that the Department of Labor's changing interpretation
was meant to incorporate advances in medical science as intended by Congress).
"I See, e.g., Donovan v. Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 766 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted) ("It is settled that where an agency departs from established precedent
without announcing a principled reason for such a reversal, its action is arbitrary .... and
an abuse of discretion . . ., and should be reversed.").
"I See, e.g., Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 175 (Department of Energy applied definition of
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pretation, litigants sometimes challenge the retroactivity, complaining that the agency's interpretation was unanticipated, and that
they were not given fair notice of, and an opportunity to comply
with, legal requirements. 2 They claim, therefore, that retroactive
application would upset their settled expectations. 221 In those instances when a retroactivity challenge succeeds, the court only
222
allows the agency to apply its interpretation prospectively.
"new oil" retroactively); Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234, 1237-39 (D. Utah 1980)
(Interior Board of Land Appeal retroactively applied ruling as to "agency statements");
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 797 (D. Del.) (FEA
attempted to apply new standards retroactively), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v.
Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
2 See Steven R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TFx. L. REv. 425,
426-27 (1987). Munzer notes:
The central purpose of law is to guide behavior. When legislatures create
rules, a person properly forms expectations about how the legal system will
respond to his actions. Retroactive laws frustrate the central purpose of law
by disrupting expectations and actions taken in reliance on them. This disruption is always costly and rarely defensible. Moreover, retroactive lawmaking
violates what is often called the rule of law, namely, an entitlement of persons
to guide their behavior by impartial rules that are publicly fixed in advance.
This violation undermines human autonomy by hindering the ability of persons
to form plans and carry them out with due regard for the rights of others.
See also Steven R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 391 (1977) ("[A]
person is morally entitled to know in advance what legal character and consequences his
acts have."); NoRmaN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 41.02, at 340 (4th ed. 1986):
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application of
new laws is usually unfair. There is general consensus among all people that
notice or warning of the rule should be given in advance of the actions whose
effects are to be judged.
21 See, e.g., Daughters of Miriam Ctr. for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1260
(3d Cir. 1978) ("[R]etroactive laws interfere with the legally-induced and settled expectations
of private parties to a greater extent than do prospective enactments."); Adams Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080 (Ist Cir. 1977) ("[L]aws that unsettle settled
rights can be harsh, and they deserve a special scrutiny."); Leedom v. International Bd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("The vice inherent in
retroactivity is, of course, that it tends to destroy predictability and to undercut relianceboth important aims of the law."); see also NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES
AN STATUTORY CONSTUCTION § 41.02, at 340 (4th ed. 1986); Charles B. Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692,
692 (1960) ("Perhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation is suspect
stems from the principle that a person should be able to plan his conduct with reasonable
certainty ... ."); Munzer, supra note 220, at 425:
One of the fundamental considerations of fairness recognized in every legal
system is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect to substantial
interests ought not to be defeated. There is evidence that results achieved
through application of judicial instinct, manifested in the pattern of decisions
on retroactivity problems, are perhaps best explained in terms of this fundamental principle of justice.
222 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1990); Stewart
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In a number of cases, litigants have based their consistency and

retroactivity challenges on individual statements.m In some instances, current or former agency officials have been asked to

testify regarding the consistency of the agency's position. 224 In other
cases, litigants have offered documents demonstrating that subordinate officials routinely applied a provision differently from the

agency's current interpretation.

Based on these documents, liti-

gants have questioned whether the agency has consistently applied

its current interpretation.2

United States v. Exxon Corp.,227 pro-

vides a good illustration. In that case, the Department of Energy's

regulatory scheme failed to address an important issue. The agency
issued an interpretation resolving the issue and sought to apply its

interpretation retroactively. The agency argued that Exxon should
have known that the regulation would be interpreted in this way.
Exxon disagreed and argued that the agency itself had been uncer-

Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846, 848-50 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he IBLA abused its
discretion by applying the Pack decisions retroactively."); Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at
1328 (agency may adjudicate so long as retroactive impact is not excessive or unwarranted);
McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1042-46 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[A] reviewing court could
require an agency to give a rule ... prospective effect only."); Quincy Oil, Inc. v. Federal
Energy Admin., 468 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that DOE not allowed to
apply agency ruling retroactively).
223See, e.g., In re Department of Energy Stripper Well Exemption, 520 F. Supp. 1232,
1255 (D. Kan. 1981) ("The defendant's argument that only official interpretations should
be examined is patently incorrect, and has been rejected by the Court on at least one prior
occasion.... [The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals] held that statements of lower
level officials should not be disregarded ....
[E]vidence of the interpretation given by lower
level officials [is considered] only as it impact[s] on the consistency and contemporaneous
construction issues."), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d 1375 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that
the court must evaluate the evidence underlying the agency's final decision, including all
relevant decision makers, not just final decision makers); United States v. Exxon Corp., 87
F.R.D. 624, 631 (D.D.C. 1980) ("The conclusion that this court can discern from Standard
Oil is consequently amorphous but not without significance. TECA clearly recognized that,
in certain circumstances, courts may look to lower level agency interpretations to decipher
the agency's own understanding of its regulations.").
4 See, e.g., United States v. Exxon, 87 F.R.D. at 630-33 (permitting discovery of
agency personnel responsible for implementing and enforcing provisions (citing Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Department of Energy, 469 F. Supp. 236 (D. Del. 1979))); see also Quincy
Oil, 468 F. Supp. at 388 (allowing discovery of lower ranking agency employees).
12 See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bowen, 835 F.2d at 364-65
(showing use of memorandum to show inconsistency); Phillips Petroleum, 449 F. Supp. at
785 (involving use of instructional material, manuals, and a memorandum).
n6 In United States v. Exxon, 87 F.R.D. at 631, the court made this point: "[I]n
certain circumstances, courts may look to lower level agency interpretations to decipher the
agency's own understanding of its regulations."
87 F.R.D. 624 (D.D.C. 1980).
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tain about the regulation's meaning. Exxon claimed that agency
officials previously interpreted the regulation differently, and sought
discovery to prove its allegations. 228
In a number of cases, courts have treated individual statements
as relevant. In Exxon, the court granted discovery of such statements in an attempt to ascertain whether the agency's interpretation
had been consistently followed. 229 The court concluded that it could
"look to lower level agency interpretations to decipher the agency's

See id. at 628-30.
The court stated:
Standard Oil, its district court precursors, Amoco Oil, and Gulf Oil, all
involve similar factual settings. In these cases, the original regulations were
either unclear or failed to address a particular situation. The DOE subsequently
released new regulations, which either clarified the prior ambiguity or delineated a course of conduct not previously addressed.
Litigation arose in these cases when the DOE attempts, or indicates its
intention, to enforce the new regulations retrospectively. This necessitates
application of the subsequent, clarifying regulations, to a prior time period
during which the situation was unaddressed or ambiguous.
The oil companies seek contemporaneous construction materials in their
quest to justify their actions. They argue such materials may document that
the DOE regulations-before the subsequent clarifications-created a situation
of ambiguity. Evidence demonstrating that DOE officials interpreted the regulations in various ways, or even perhaps construed them as sanctioning the
industry conduct, advances the industry defendants' defenses.
This is exactly the situation in the instant case. The original CLC regulations, released in 1973, failed to address whether a property unitization must
also aggregate its attendant BPCL's. The subsequent regulations, however,
required an aggregated BPCL for a unitized property. The DOE now attempts
to enforce the subsequent regulations retrospectively. It claims that Exxon
should have instituted a unitized BPCL as of June 1, 1975.
Exxon claims, however, that only on September 1, 1976, did it become
clear that a unitized property must also establish an aggregated BPCL. On
this date the DOE released its definition of significant alteration in producing
patterns. Accordingly, Exxon claims that its failure to unitize until September
1, 1976, was, under the circumstances, fully justified. It argues that the DOE
is retrospectively enforcing regulations; the enforcement allegedly applies to a
time period during which the original regulations were ambiguous and failed
to address the legitimacy of the conduct engaged in by Exxon.
The instant case, along with Standard Oil, Amoco Oil, and Gulf Oil,
teach [sic] a uniform lesson. Blinded deference to official agency interpretation
is unwarranted when the DOE attempts to enforce, retrospectively, new regulations that clarify a situation unaddressed by the prior regulatory scheme.
In this situation, contemporaneous construction is valuable to the court. It
enables the court to determine whether those responsible for the enforcement
of the original regulations found them ambiguous. And it should also reveal
whether DOE employees interpreted the regulation in varying manners, perhaps
even as sanctioning the industry conduct.
Id. at 633.
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own understanding of its regulations." 23 0 In cases like Exxon,
courts consider the views of low-level employees for a limited
purpose. They are not concerned with whether the employee agrees
with the agency's interpretation. Rather, they consider the employee's statements only to determine how agency officials applied
regulatory provisions during the relevant time frame.23'
There is considerable disagreement among the courts about the
desirability of using individual statements in this way. Courts agree
that, except in rare cases, they will not reject an agency's interpretation based solely on the contrary view of a subordinate. In
Pennzoil, for example, the plaintiff claimed to have relied on the
advice of several agency officials regarding the meaning of
regulations 232 and argued that this advice diminished the degree of
deference due the agency's interpretation. 231 The court disagreed,
noting that this advice was insufficiently authoritative .2 4 Likewise,

2" Id. at 631.
2 PhillipsPetroleum involved

statements by low-level officials in the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA). The court noted that there was "a dispute in this case ... over
what, if any, interpretation of the regulations the FEA adopted during the relevant period."
DOE argued that it had adopted a particular interpretation, and it sought to dismiss
statements by subordinates "as clearly erroneous and merely the unauthorized and unofficial
views of several of the agency's auditors." The agency also argued "that only the agency's
General Counsel and his staff had the authority to issue official interpretations of its
regulations ...... PhillipsPetroleum, 449 F. Supp. at 784. The court disagreed, noting that
the agency did not officially interpret the regulations during the period in question, and
that the auditor's views were evidence of the agency's understanding of the regulatory
requirements. The court also noted that the understandings of these auditors were "highly
relevant and material evidence of the general understanding of ambiguous regulatory provisions." Id. As a result, such statements were discoverable.
"3 See Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 166.
' See id. at 171. Prior to the issuance of the interpretive ruling in question, the
agency had issued five interpretations of the regulatory provision, none of which had been
published. In each instance, the agency had acted consistently with its later ruling. Prior to
the issuance of the last interpretive ruling, Pennzoil relied on informal advice in adopting
a contrary interpretation of the regulatory term in question. Pennzoil claimed to have relied
on "guidance from FEO [Federal Energy Office] officials in Houston, Texas, regarding the
proper method of pricing crude oil from the Field after unitization." Id. at 166. The FEO
was a predecessor agency of the DOE. Two communications are the "guidance" on which
this claim was based. An intra-company memorandum makes reference to an "unidentified
agency informant" that advised Pennzoil to take the position that it did. In addition, a
letter from counsel refers to a conversation "with James Langdon, Esquire, Director of the
Office of Regulatory Review of the Federal Energy Office." Id. at 166. Pennzoil claimed
that this informal advice diminished the degree of deference due the agency's interpretive
ruling. The court disagreed.
'- Id. at 171. The court stated, in full:
With further reference to Pennzoil's reliance upon informal advice as a diminishment of deference to be accorded to the agency's ruling, it is worth
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in Arizona Electric Power Cooperative v. FERC,25 the court refused to give much weight to testimony by an agency's staff member in hearings on an interim curtailment plan.2 6 The petitioner
argued that it had relied on this testimony, and that the testimony

could be used to undercut the agency's differing interpretation.
The court rejected both of these arguments.2 7 Other decisions are
in accord.?8
Even when a number of subordinates have adopted a particular
interpretation, so that it can be said to rise to the level of custom
and practice, many courts are reluctant to consider such evidence.

remembering that opinions are to be given little weight, as such, unless they
are institutional in character.
Id. Of course, these statements might form the basis for a retroactivity challenge. See
Russell L. Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations:An Analysis of JudicialResponses, 61 NoTR D.imE L. Ray. 167 (1986).
- 631 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
21 See Arizona Elec. Power Coop. v. FERC, 631 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
217See id. at 816 (noting that the testimony "was far removed from the type of specific
guidance" required).
"I See, e.g., Lile v. University of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics, 886 F.2d 157, 161 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1989) (A conflict existed between the Surgeon General and a subordinate. The Surgeon
General reversed the decision of the subordinate. The court found no evidence of agency
inconsistency. Only the Surgeon General's decision constituted final agency action, and he
was free to overrule the subordinate's findings.). In Marine Eng'r Beneficial Association
No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 550 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953), the court
concluded that there was "sharp dispute between the parties" regarding the interpretive
question at issue. The court found that the evidence was "interesting but not conclusive"
noting:
The interpretation of its enabling act by an administrative body is, of course,
important as bearing upon the effect of a statute, but interpretation given by
an individual member of a Board or by its attorney is not, we think, to be
taken as that official kind of interpretation to which courts must pay attention.
Id. As a result, the court interpreted the statute itself.
Another interesting decision is Southern Goods Corp. v. Bowles, 158 F.2d 587 (4th
Cir. 1946). In that case, an assistant general counsel issued an interpretation for the benefit
of attorneys administering the price control regulations. The court concluded that an
interpretation issued by an attorney "is not entitled to the weight that the courts accord to
an administrative interpretation evidenced by settled administrative practice." Id. at 590.
The court noted: "It would be absurd to hold that the courts must subordinate their
judgment as to the meaning of a statute or regulation to the mere unsupported opinion of
associate counsel in an administrative department." Id. But the court deferred, noting:
"Since ... the interpretation in question received the sanction of the Administrator as an
official interpretation, it is entitled to respectful consideration by us in interpreting the
regulation.... ." Id.
In some instances, courts rely on agency regulations in refusing to accord much weight
to the positions of lower-level officials. For example, in City of Gillette v. FERC, 737 F.2d
883 (10th Cir. 1984), agency regulations authorized staff members to render opinions and
advice but provided that those opinions would "'not bind the Commission or any person
delegated authority to act on its behalf."' Id. at 885.
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Illustrative of this is the holding in San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace v. NRC. 2 9 There, the petitioners argued that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's construction of its own regulations was
not entitled to deference because the agency had previously interpreted the regulation inconsistently. The prior inconsistent interpretations had all been rendered by agency staff u ° The court
concluded that, despite the staff interpretations, the agency's interpretation was entitled to deference.2 1 In Kwan v. Donovan, 2
the court found the agency's interpretation to be perfectly acceptable. However, previously, ALJs within the department had interpreted the regulation inconsistently. The court concluded that the
ALJ interpretations did not undercut the justifications for defer-

ence.73
There is, however, contrary authority. Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Department of Energy- involved statements by low-level officials in the Federal Energy Administration (FEA).US The FEA
-9789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
'- See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir.) ("The
Commission has never applied its regulation in any way except the way it did here. Indeed
petitioners' only support for their claim is apparently that the Commission's staff has called
for emergency plans to consider the potential complicating effects of earthquakes."), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
24, See id. ("The position of an agency's staff, taken before the agency itself decided
the point, does not invalidate the agency's subsequent application and interpretation of its
own regulations."); see also Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512, 1521 (1986) (The case involved
the Department of HHS's Appeals Council, which, on its own motion, decided to review
an ALJ's determinations. The Appeals Council reversed both determinations. The court
concluded that the Appeals Council had the authority to review the determination.).
777 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1985).

24

See Parker v. Bowen, 777 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1985). The court stated:
The fact that administrative law judges within the Department of Labor may
have employed inconsistent interpretations of business necessity prior to the
promulgation of the Secretary's interpretation is irrelevant. With the great
deference we accord an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, we must
reject Kwan's argument.

-,

Id.
449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del. 1978).
The court noted:
There is a dispute in this case, however, over what, if any, interpretation
of the regulations the FEA adopted during the relevant period. The plaintiffs
cite numerous public statements by FEA personnel endorsing the proportional
method and contend that the FEA construed the regulations in effect during
the relevant period to permit use of that method. The PEA attempts to dismiss
the pronouncements on which the plaintiffs rely as clearly erroneous and
merely the unauthorized and unofficial views of several of the agency's auditors.
Id. at 784.
'"
24
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sought to dismiss these statements as "unauthorized and unofficial
views of several of the agency's auditors." 246 The FEA argued that
only the agency's General Counsel and his staff "had the authority
to issue official interpretations of its regulations. '247 The court
disagreed, noting that the agency did not officially interpret the
regulations during the period in question, and that the auditor's
views were evidence of the agency's understanding of the regulatory
requirements. 2 8 The court held that the understandings of these
auditors were "highly relevant and material evidence of the general
understanding of ambiguous regulatory provisions."''249 As a result,

such statements were discoverable5 0
United States v. Exxon obviously adopts a different approach
than that taken in San Luis Obispo and Kwan. That court was
simply more willing to consider statements by subordinates. Which
line of precedent is preferable? It is difficult to argue that state-

ments by subordinates, to the extent that they rise to the level of
custom and practice, should not be considered.351 In cases like

2A'

Id.

27

Id.
See id.

M

-

Id.

The validity of such discovery is open to question. See ContemporaneousConstruction Discovery, supra note 204, at 381-88.
Even when discovery is granted, there will be limits on its scope. The court must
balance the need for discovery against the burden imposed thereby. See Exxon v. Department
of Energy, 91 F.R.D. at 42 (holding that "discovery can reasonably be tailored to minimize
DOE's burden of search"); United States v. Exxon, 87 F.R.D. at 634 ("We believe that
there is no hard and fast rule to guide a court in resolving the scope of relevant contemporaneous construction. Instead, a court must balance the potential relevance of the desired
evidence, along with the likelihood of its existence, against the burden incurred by the
agency in culling through its files."). Courts have placed various restrictions, limiting
discovery to various time frames, see Exxon v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D. at 42
(limiting discovery to period from Aug. 6, 1973 to Oct. 2, 1978); United States v. Exxon,
87 F.R.D. at 635 (adopting cut off date of Sept. 1, 1976), and to documents prepared by
certain types of officials. See ContemporaneousConstruction Discovery, supra note 204, at
381.
25 See Phillips Petroleum, 449 F. Supp. at 784:
[S]tatements by auditors and other officials of the agency... [have] value as
evidence of contemporaneous construction. This is especially true here because
the Court has assumed arguendo that the FEA did not officially interpret the
regulations to require use of the proportional method, and therefore will
examine the evidence of contemporaneous construction only to determine
whether the FEA construed the regulations during the relevant period to
require use of the NPCI Last method and whether the language of the
regulations supports an interpretation which would permit use of the proportional method. Given the limited extent of the inquiry, it is clearly appropriate
to resort to the experience and informed judgment of auditors, compliance

1991-921

REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS

1033

Exxon, when an agency announces its interpretation of a regulatory
provision and asserts that the interpretation was one previously
adopted, consideration of such statements may be particularly appropriate. But, evidence of positions taken by subordinates will

rarely be readily available. As a result, when courts have been
willing to consider such evidence, they have been met with broad
requests for discovery. 2 2 Litigants have often sought information
regarding how subordinate officials, particularly those involved in
compliance such as auditors and staff attorneys, applied regulatory

provisions . 53 During the early 1980s, there was considerable litigation against the DOE on this issue. This litigation presented
many problems for the courts. One simply concluded that "this
type of litigation just cannot be controlled under present circum-

stances."1214

officials, staff attorneys and others within the FEA for guidance. Courts
consider contemporaneous expressions of opinion by low-ranking officials
highly relevant and material evidence of the general understanding of ambiguous regulatory provisions.
252 During the 1970s and 1980s, litigants used a form of discovery called "contemporaneous construction discovery" in an attempt to challenge regulatory interpretations. See,
e.g., United States v. Exxon, 87 F.R.D. at 624 (holding oil company entitled to use
"contemporaneous construction discovery" of DOE); Tenneco, 475 F. Supp. at 318 (holding
oil company entitled to use "contemporaneous construction discovery" to complete administrative record); Gulf Oil, 465 F. Supp. at 918 (granting oil company order to depose two
former FEA officials). For a discussion of this type of discovery, see Contemporaneous
ConstructionDiscovery, supra note 204.
This discovery took a number of different forms. In some cases, litigants hoped to
demonstrate that an agency's interpretation conflicted with its original intent. See Gulf Oil,
465 F. Supp. 913; Amoco, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 404-05. Accordingly, litigants
sought to depose those officials responsible for promulgating the regulations, see Gulf Oil,
465 F. Supp. at 916 (involving litigants that sought discovery of "agency officials responsible
for ... formulating the regulations"), and sought to obtain documents prepared during
the promulgation process. See Amoco, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 404-05 (extending
discovery to pre-promulgation documents in attempt to find out what "the law was"). In
other cases, litigants sought to discover how the agency interpreted the regulation immediately after it was issued, see Hydrocarbon Trading & Transp. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 89
F.R.D. 650, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that discovery would be allowed, but only if
Exxon could show its relevancy by demonstrating that the regulation was ambiguous);
United States v. Exxon, 87 F.R.D. at 630-33 (holding that discovery during the relevant
period was allowed); Tenneco, 475 F. Supp. at 318 (holding that discovery of all relevant
materials was allowed), and at later points. See, e.g., United States v. Exxon, 87 F.R.D. at
630-33; see also Quincy Oil, 468 F. Supp. at 388 (allowing discovery over the entire relevant
period). The goal in these cases was to demonstrate that the agency's position had been
inconsistent over time. See also ContemporaneousConstruction Discovery, supra note 204,
at 381.
11 See Phillips Petroleum, 449 F. Supp. at 784.
2 Department of Energy v. Crocker, 629 F.2d 1341, 1345 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1980) (quoting statement made in oral argument in Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D.
514 (D. Del. 1980)).

0
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In a prior article, I discussed the propriety of this so-called
"contemporaneous construction discovery."5 That article suggested that discovery is appropriate in some situations, but generally should be limited. 256 An American Bar Association
Administrative Law Section report goes even further. It suggests
that this type of discovery has been severely curtailed by the federal
courts and should not be permitted.2 5 7 Although the ABA may
have overstated the situation, there is little question but that any
discovery should be severely restricted. In many cases, discovery
will be completely unnecessary. Litigants will be able to examine
the agency's public statements and determine how the agency has
interpreted a regulatory provision. Even when discovery is necessary, it can be limited. As the ABA Administrative Law Section
suggests, broad discovery is rarely warranted.258
CONCLUSION
Interpretive statements by individual agency employees have
presented particular problems for the federal courts. The deference
rule assumes the existence of authoritative administrative interpretations, but such interpretations do not always exist. In many
instances, the only available interpretations have been rendered by
subordinates. Still, courts are often asked to defer to such interpretations.
When an agency has failed to take a position on a regulatory
issue, a reviewing court could refuse to defer. It would then be
free to determine independently the meaning of a regulatory provision. But most courts are reluctant to ignore individual statements. The usual practice is to examine such statements to see
whether they are reasonable, and whether they are sufficiently
authoritative to qualify for deference. In some cases, courts find
that the interpreting official has expertise, is exercising delegated
authority, and therefore is entitled to deference.
25sSee

ContemporaneousConstruction Discovery, supra note 204.

2% Id. at 381-88.
2 The report stated:
This type of discovery has never been squarely approved at the appellate
level.... Since Pennzoil, no reported cases have authorized "contemporaneous construction" discovery. Apparently courts have concluded, with some
justification, that the low probative value of this type of evidence will rarely
outweigh the burdens and delay involved in uncovering it.
Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section
Report, 38 ADMIm. L. REv. 239, 279 n.19 (1986).
2-" See Contemporaneous ConstructionDiscovery, supra note 204, at 383-88.

1991-92]

REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS

1035

But, courts disagree about which statements qualify for deference. As the foregoing discussion suggests, few courts defer except
when an individual statement is institutional in character. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to determine which interpretations
have that quality. An analysis of recent cases suggests that courts
are justified in treating certain individual statements as authoritative. Included are interpretive statements by the head of an agency,
and those by subordinates that have been designated to make
statements on the agency's behalf in litigation or before Congress.
Deference might also be justified in other instances, such as when
an ALJ has rendered an interpretation, or when an agency has
taken an interpretive position in litigation. Ultimately, each case
requires a careful assessment of the individual facts presented.
There is little question that courts sometimes do defer, and are
justified in deferring, to individual interpretations.

